UHC Forward: Towards Universal Health Coverage

One of the central aspects of the 1993 reform involved separating the financing, stewardship, and delivery functions within the health system. While hospitals still receive some supply-side subsidies through the SGP, the spirit of the reform is to eventually transform them into demand-side subsidies. Health service providers must now compete on the basis of quality for the majority of services provided. Under this scheme EPSs and EPSSs negotiate contracts with service providers. They also coordinate service delivery between patients and a network of public and private providers. Preventive and primary care services are primarily contracted by capitation, with EPSs providing such services through vertically integrated networks and EPSSs providing such services mainly through public hospitals. Most specialist and hospital care is paid for either by service packages or on a fee-for-service basis.

Colombia’s provider market features two levels of market competition. On the first level, enrollees choose their EPS or EPSS based on the quality of its provider network. On the second level, the EPSs and EPSSs select their provider network based on their price and quality. Therefore, there are real incentives within the system for providers to supply better quality services at lower prices.

Services are organized by levels of care. The first level includes facilities that offer general medicine. This level is supposed to provide the majority of services. The second level comprises providers of basic specialized medical and surgical services. Finally, the third level includes institutions that provide specialty and sub-specialty care as well as high complexity hospitalization.

Providers must meet minimum quality, financial, and administrative standards that are enforced by the Ministry of Social Protection (MPS). Providers must also register at the local health authority, which issues a three year certificate. The health authority verification is met through an on-site inspection. Furthermore, since 2002 the Obligatory System to Guarantee the Quality of Health Services (SOGCS) has helped to maintain and improve the quality of health services by focusing on accreditation, audit, and information management.

In terms of monitoring service providers, Law 100 mandated the establishment of a compulsory quality assurance system. However, the creation of such a mechanism lagged behind the implementation of other facets of the reform. In 2002, a quality assurance system was finally implemented that introduced a licensing and accreditation process for both public and private facilities. And in 2006 a systematic dissemination of hospitals’ quality began to take place on a regular basis.

The reforms restructured the health delivery system to form a completely new PHC sector and introduced retraining mechanisms for physicians in order to establish a cadre of autonomous primary care providers across the country. From 2000 to 2003 alone, the share of primary care expenditures in total health spending increased from 17% to 31%.

Enrollees are free to choose a family group practice for their primary care and they can switch once per year during the annual registration period. In large urban settings, practices that offer higher quality services will attract a larger number of patients, leading to higher capitation payments for the practice. Rural areas, however, have too few providers in order to create this type of quality incentive.

After the primary care reforms created the undergraduate, postgraduate, and continuing education curricula, the number of primary care physicians rose significantly from 5.8 per 1,000 population in 2001 to 8.2 per 1,000 population in 2005. Furthermore, by the end of 2004, 75 percent of primary care physicians and nurses had been retrained as family physicians and family medicine nurses.

Kyrgyzstan has three types of primary care providers. First, the core of the old rural health system, Feldsher-Obstetric Ambulatory Points (FAPs) are facilities in the most remote reaches of the country that offer basic services such as neonatal care, immunizations, and health education. As of 2006 there were 875 FAPs across Kyrgyzstan, each serving between 500 and 2,000 people. Second, Family Group Practices (FGPs) are the major providers of primary care in Kyrgyzstan. FGPs are normally made up of three to five doctors. They can be freestanding and autonomous entities or units within large hospital polyclinics. Finally, Family Medicine Centers (FMCs) are large outpatient facilities staffed by varying numbers of specialists, often 10 to 20 health care professionals in addition to their affiliated FGPs. Their service offerings range from primary care to specialized care, including instrumental diagnostics. In 2006, approximately 93% of FAPs and 96% of FGPs were part of Family Medicine Centers.

Secondary care is provided by hospitals at the oblast level (generally one oblast merged hospital in each oblast), and by territorial hospitals in rayons and cities (51 hospitals nationally). The main difference between these two types of hospitals lies in the variety and complexity of conditions that they can handle. Tertiary care that provides highly specialized services is conducted in eight central-level hospitals. In terms of legal organization, most health care organizations tend to be public. The exceptions are optic, dental, urologic, and gynecological services, which tend to be private facilities and are mostly concentrated in the capital city of Bishkek.

In 1985, two modalities of health service provision were established for FONASA beneficiaries. Under the Institutional Modality (IM), FONASA beneficiaries can access the public system in order to use public hospitals. Financial coverage under this modality is dependent upon the income of the beneficiary. Under the Free Election Modality (FEM), FONASA beneficiaries can opt to use private health service providers that have entered into agreements with FONASA. Financial coverage under this modality depends on the category to which the health service provider is subscribed. Generally, FEM copayments are larger than IM copayments.

Chile’s service delivery system is composed of 26 autonomous health authorities responsible for hospital care. Primary health care was decentralized down to the level of the municipality. In Chile, 80% of hospital beds are public. FONASA is required to purchase most of its health services from public institutions, although it does provide a subsidy to its enrollees wishing to purchase services from private providers. Public health care providers must sell most of their services to FONASA and have strict guidelines on the type and number of services they can make available to private patients or ISAPRE beneficiaries. FONASA categories B, C, and D can elect to receive care outside of the public system for a higher co-payment. Category A enrollees must receive services from the public provider system.

Of all the AUGE procedures carried out, 86% are conducted at the primary health level. Meanwhile, of the AUGE procedures for FONASA beneficiaries performed in the private sector, 90% correspond to dialysis treatment. Whenever there is a risk of falling behind on the guarantees, services must be purchased from elsewhere. For example, in the case of cancer a public hospital will normally purchase services from another public hospital. In the case of cataracts, however, a public hospital will normally purchase services from the private sector.

The AUGE plan has changed the manner in which health service delivery is viewed. In the past, supply determined how many cataract interventions were performed based on the internal capacity of the institution. But now, with certain services explicitly guaranteed, the health system has to detect the prevalence of cataracts and determine how to best reorganize resources in order to satisfy demand.

Chile has also instituted a free telephone line that responds to inquiries regarding a number of different health situations. It is staffed by a team that has the ability to provide medical advice and set up consultations. This service has led to a significant reduction in emergency room visits, as problems that are deemed non-urgent can be resolved through primary care personnel.

Finally, it is worth noting that ISAPREs are not allowed to provide health services directly to their enrollees. They must rely on horizontal networks of health care providers and hospitals for the delivery of services.