The Joint Learning Network for Universal Health Coverage systematically documents the reforms of its member countries and other countries that have expanded health coverage through demand-side financing. The case studies contained in these pages are brief, comparative and modular in nature, describing the key highlights and technical features of each program.
Compare various dimensions of country reform efforts using our interactive tool.
| Program | Primary source of funding | Secondary source of funding | Contributing Populations | Types of Contributions | Funding | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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| : Taiwan: National Health Insurance |
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Revenue for the National Health Insurance (NHI) system comes primarily from individual payroll deductions and employer contributions, supplemented by governmental funds from general revenue. A small proportion of revenue also comes from a “sin tax” on cigarette sales. The working population pays premiums that are split with employers while non-working individuals pay a flat rate which is subsidized by the government. Read full sectionRevenue for the National Health Insurance (NHI) system comes primarily from individual payroll deductions and employer contributions, supplemented by governmental funds from general revenue. A small proportion of revenue also comes from a “sin tax” on cigarette sales. The working population pays premiums that are split with employers while non-working individuals pay a flat rate which is subsidized by the government. The share of premiums paid by the insured, employers, and government varies greatly within the different population subgroups and also varies based on how many dependents an individual has. For public or private employees the government pays 10%, the employer 60%, and the employee 30% through a payroll deduction. The non-poor self-employed pay 100% of their income-based premium without a government subsidy. For the poor who are unable to pay the premium and for military personnel, the government subsidizes 100% of the premium from general government revenues.
In 2002, the Supreme Court in Taiwan ruled that no one could be denied care because of lack of ability to pay. For those temporarily unable to pay, the Bureau of National Health Insurance (BNHI) has a fund from which such people may take out interest-free loans to pay premiums. Taiwan’s economy has advanced to a stage where most workers were employed in the formal sector, so a compulsory NHI can effectively collect premiums through employers. The government also has the revenue to subsidize the coverage of the poor, veterans, and farmers. Taiwan also has the organizational ability and human resources to manage national health insurance. The premiums are supplemented by out-of-pocket payments. Regular office visits have co-payments that are fixed and unvaried by the person’s income in the realm of about 10% of the cost of an inpatient visit—adjusted according to type of wards and length of stay—and 20% for an outpatient visit. Both co-payments and premiums are waived for the very poor and veterans. To help cope with NHI budget pressures, patient cost sharing increased in 2001 and again in 2002 for certain kinds of visits, drugs, inpatient care, lab tests and examinations. These copayments are unvaried by income to avoid the burden of administering a complex individual income-related-cost-sharing program. Though out-of-pocket payments fell from 48% of the total amount spent on health care in 1993 to 30% in 2000, critics still argue that the copayments are regressive, putting the burden primarily on the sick that are already disadvantaged and are often poor.
National Health InsuranceFunding Primary Source of Funding: Member contributions
Secondary Source of Funding: General government revenues, Employer contributions
Contributing Populations: Formal Sector, Government Employees, Informal Sector
Types of Contributions: Premiums, Co-payments Revenue for the National Health Insurance (NHI) system comes primarily from individual payroll deductions and employer contributions, supplemented by governmental funds from general revenue. A small proportion of revenue also comes from a “sin tax” on cigarette sales. The working population pays premiums that are split with employers while non-working individuals pay a flat rate which is subsidized by the government. The share of premiums paid by the insured, employers, and government varies greatly within the different population subgroups and also varies based on how many dependents an individual has. For public or private employees the government pays 10%, the employer 60%, and the employee 30% through a payroll deduction. The non-poor self-employed pay 100% of their income-based premium without a government subsidy. For the poor who are unable to pay the premium and for military personnel, the government subsidizes 100% of the premium from general government revenues.
In 2002, the Supreme Court in Taiwan ruled that no one could be denied care because of lack of ability to pay. For those temporarily unable to pay, the Bureau of National Health Insurance (BNHI) has a fund from which such people may take out interest-free loans to pay premiums. Taiwan’s economy has advanced to a stage where most workers were employed in the formal sector, so a compulsory NHI can effectively collect premiums through employers. The government also has the revenue to subsidize the coverage of the poor, veterans, and farmers. Taiwan also has the organizational ability and human resources to manage national health insurance. The premiums are supplemented by out-of-pocket payments. Regular office visits have co-payments that are fixed and unvaried by the person’s income in the realm of about 10% of the cost of an inpatient visit—adjusted according to type of wards and length of stay—and 20% for an outpatient visit. Both co-payments and premiums are waived for the very poor and veterans. To help cope with NHI budget pressures, patient cost sharing increased in 2001 and again in 2002 for certain kinds of visits, drugs, inpatient care, lab tests and examinations. These copayments are unvaried by income to avoid the burden of administering a complex individual income-related-cost-sharing program. Though out-of-pocket payments fell from 48% of the total amount spent on health care in 1993 to 30% in 2000, critics still argue that the copayments are regressive, putting the burden primarily on the sick that are already disadvantaged and are often poor.
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| Brazil: Unified Health System (SUS) |
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Federal resources originating in a pool of value-added, general income, financial operations and insurance, export, and import taxes flow into the National Health Fund (NHF), which then funnels resources in five separate directions. First, the NHF transfers resources to both the State Health Funds (SHF) and the Municipal Health Funds (MHF), which are responsible for consolidating resources from the different sources. Second, the NHF transfers resources to public and private hospitals, public and private health care providers, and to special health programs such as the PSF. The same type of resource re-allocation occurs at both the state and municipal levels, with the following exceptions. (1) The State Health Fund only transfers resources to the Municipal Health Fund, and (2) the Municipal Health Fund does not transfer resources to any other administrative bodies. The Health Secretariats at both the State and Municipal levels oversee the administration of funds provided by the different sources. Read full sectionFederal resources originating in a pool of value-added, general income, financial operations and insurance, export, and import taxes flow into the National Health Fund (NHF), which then funnels resources in five separate directions. First, the NHF transfers resources to both the State Health Funds (SHF) and the Municipal Health Funds (MHF), which are responsible for consolidating resources from the different sources. Second, the NHF transfers resources to public and private hospitals, public and private health care providers, and to special health programs such as the PSF. The same type of resource re-allocation occurs at both the state and municipal levels, with the following exceptions. (1) The State Health Fund only transfers resources to the Municipal Health Fund, and (2) the Municipal Health Fund does not transfer resources to any other administrative bodies. The Health Secretariats at both the State and Municipal levels oversee the administration of funds provided by the different sources.
Funding of the SUS takes place through a variety of resource streams. In 2001, federal funds were transferred to municipalities through 78 different mechanisms and programs, which were linked to particular administrative requirements, as well as planning and control instruments. Some of these mechanisms pay for production, while others pay for coverage on a per capita basis. Individuals have argued that such a system could lead to high transaction costs. Indeed, a recent study found that in 2007, private insurance and commercial plans allocated 81% of their revenue for the payment of medical services, whereas the Ministry of Health allocated only 66% of its resources to such an end. There are five primary funding mechanisms through which the National Health Fund channels resources for services rendered under the SUS.
Between 1985 and 1996, federal financing for public health fell from 73% to 54% of public resources for health. Meanwhile, municipalities augmented their total share of national health costs from 9% to 28%, while states remained at 18%. During this same time period, looking at the responsibility for spending those resources, the federal share fell from 67% to 46%, while that of the municipalities increased from 10% to 35%. In other words, there has been a clear progression towards municipal responsibility for both the mobilization and utilization of resources. In 2001, a constitutional amendment declared that federal funds must be allocated in an amount equal to the prior year’s budget, adjusted for GNP, starting with the 1999 budget as a reference. Furthermore, the amendment stipulated that states and municipalities must increase their health spending until it reaches 12% of the state budget and 15% of the municipal budget. However, the amendment did not define what could and could not be considered an expense. Therefore, state and local governments began including expenses such as food stamps and care for prisoners that had previously been accounted for elsewhere. Thus it is difficult to ascertain which municipalities and states actually increased public health activities and attempted to improve the delivery of care. Funding for the Family Health Program (PSF) by the national government consisted of a flat, one-time transfer for establishing a new PSF team. Thereafter, variable transfers are meant to incentivize continuous expansion of coverage. Table II highlights the incentives in place for the expansion of the PSF in 2002. Table 1: Financial Incentives for the Family Health Program
Source: La Forgia, G. (This incentive model was in place during the first 10 years of the Family Health Program. It is no longer in use.) The Brazilian health system also has a sizable private health sector known as the Supplementary Health System (SHS). Since 1988, consumption of private health insurance has grown substantially— particularly among the middle class—with private spending rising faster than public spending. Income tax breaks that compensate for private expenses on health care account for some of this growth. Unified Health System (SUS)Funding Primary Source of Funding: General government revenues
Secondary Source of Funding:
Contributing Populations:
Types of Contributions: Federal resources originating in a pool of value-added, general income, financial operations and insurance, export, and import taxes flow into the National Health Fund (NHF), which then funnels resources in five separate directions. First, the NHF transfers resources to both the State Health Funds (SHF) and the Municipal Health Funds (MHF), which are responsible for consolidating resources from the different sources. Second, the NHF transfers resources to public and private hospitals, public and private health care providers, and to special health programs such as the PSF. The same type of resource re-allocation occurs at both the state and municipal levels, with the following exceptions. (1) The State Health Fund only transfers resources to the Municipal Health Fund, and (2) the Municipal Health Fund does not transfer resources to any other administrative bodies. The Health Secretariats at both the State and Municipal levels oversee the administration of funds provided by the different sources.
Funding of the SUS takes place through a variety of resource streams. In 2001, federal funds were transferred to municipalities through 78 different mechanisms and programs, which were linked to particular administrative requirements, as well as planning and control instruments. Some of these mechanisms pay for production, while others pay for coverage on a per capita basis. Individuals have argued that such a system could lead to high transaction costs. Indeed, a recent study found that in 2007, private insurance and commercial plans allocated 81% of their revenue for the payment of medical services, whereas the Ministry of Health allocated only 66% of its resources to such an end. There are five primary funding mechanisms through which the National Health Fund channels resources for services rendered under the SUS.
Between 1985 and 1996, federal financing for public health fell from 73% to 54% of public resources for health. Meanwhile, municipalities augmented their total share of national health costs from 9% to 28%, while states remained at 18%. During this same time period, looking at the responsibility for spending those resources, the federal share fell from 67% to 46%, while that of the municipalities increased from 10% to 35%. In other words, there has been a clear progression towards municipal responsibility for both the mobilization and utilization of resources. In 2001, a constitutional amendment declared that federal funds must be allocated in an amount equal to the prior year’s budget, adjusted for GNP, starting with the 1999 budget as a reference. Furthermore, the amendment stipulated that states and municipalities must increase their health spending until it reaches 12% of the state budget and 15% of the municipal budget. However, the amendment did not define what could and could not be considered an expense. Therefore, state and local governments began including expenses such as food stamps and care for prisoners that had previously been accounted for elsewhere. Thus it is difficult to ascertain which municipalities and states actually increased public health activities and attempted to improve the delivery of care. Funding for the Family Health Program (PSF) by the national government consisted of a flat, one-time transfer for establishing a new PSF team. Thereafter, variable transfers are meant to incentivize continuous expansion of coverage. Table II highlights the incentives in place for the expansion of the PSF in 2002. Table 1: Financial Incentives for the Family Health Program
Source: La Forgia, G. (This incentive model was in place during the first 10 years of the Family Health Program. It is no longer in use.) The Brazilian health system also has a sizable private health sector known as the Supplementary Health System (SHS). Since 1988, consumption of private health insurance has grown substantially— particularly among the middle class—with private spending rising faster than public spending. Income tax breaks that compensate for private expenses on health care account for some of this growth. |
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| Thailand: Universal Coverage Scheme |
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The Universal Coverage Scheme (UCS) is financed through general tax revenues paid to local contracting units on the basis of population size. The UCS reform raised public health spending from about 66.25 billion Baht in 2000-01 to 72.78 billion Baht in 2001-02. In recent years, the government has responded to criticisms claiming that UCS is underfinanced by raising the budget for the scheme. Read full sectionThe Universal Coverage Scheme (UCS) is financed through general tax revenues paid to local contracting units on the basis of population size. The UCS reform raised public health spending from about 66.25 billion Baht in 2000-01 to 72.78 billion Baht in 2001-02. In recent years, the government has responded to criticisms claiming that UCS is underfinanced by raising the budget for the scheme. General tax revenue was decided as the source of funding for the UCS because of the political urgency and focus on nationwide scale-up. The target population for the scheme is largely in the informal, agricultural sector and does do not have access to consistent cash income for any kind of regular premium payment, therefore making premium collection difficult. A copayment of Baht 30 was also implemented. This copayment was exempted for low income people, children below 12 years old and the elderly (i.e., those above 60 years old). While this copayment did not reflect the marginal cost of interventions, it did prevent overuse. The 30 Baht copayment was abolished in November 2006 for political reasons. However, abolition of the 30 Baht copayment had no effect on overall utilization of out-patient services. This is likely because the majority of beneficiaries have been already exempted from the copayment. The UCS reform raised public health spending from about 66.25 billion Baht in 2000-01 to 72.78 billion Baht in 2001-02. Thus, the reform cost US $175 million. The overall budget for UCS has increased to 82.02 billion (18%) and 91.36 billion (10%) in the years 2006 and 2007 respectively. Co-financing arrangements for the scheme are currently being considered—for example, one proposal suggests partial or non-subsidization of medical care costs for beneficiaries who decide to stay in a private room. Universal Coverage SchemeFunding Primary Source of Funding: General government revenues
Secondary Source of Funding: None
Contributing Populations:
Types of Contributions: None The Universal Coverage Scheme (UCS) is financed through general tax revenues paid to local contracting units on the basis of population size. The UCS reform raised public health spending from about 66.25 billion Baht in 2000-01 to 72.78 billion Baht in 2001-02. In recent years, the government has responded to criticisms claiming that UCS is underfinanced by raising the budget for the scheme. General tax revenue was decided as the source of funding for the UCS because of the political urgency and focus on nationwide scale-up. The target population for the scheme is largely in the informal, agricultural sector and does do not have access to consistent cash income for any kind of regular premium payment, therefore making premium collection difficult. A copayment of Baht 30 was also implemented. This copayment was exempted for low income people, children below 12 years old and the elderly (i.e., those above 60 years old). While this copayment did not reflect the marginal cost of interventions, it did prevent overuse. The 30 Baht copayment was abolished in November 2006 for political reasons. However, abolition of the 30 Baht copayment had no effect on overall utilization of out-patient services. This is likely because the majority of beneficiaries have been already exempted from the copayment. The UCS reform raised public health spending from about 66.25 billion Baht in 2000-01 to 72.78 billion Baht in 2001-02. Thus, the reform cost US $175 million. The overall budget for UCS has increased to 82.02 billion (18%) and 91.36 billion (10%) in the years 2006 and 2007 respectively. Co-financing arrangements for the scheme are currently being considered—for example, one proposal suggests partial or non-subsidization of medical care costs for beneficiaries who decide to stay in a private room. |
