Compare: Funding

Joint Learning Network for Universal Health Coverage

The Joint Learning Network for Universal Health Coverage systematically documents the reforms of its member countries and other countries that have expanded health coverage through demand-side financing. The case studies contained in these pages are brief, comparative and modular in nature, describing the key highlights and technical features of each program.


Compare various dimensions of country reform efforts using our interactive tool.


Program Primary source of funding Secondary source of funding Contributing Populations Types of Contributions Funding
Vietnam: Compulsory and Voluntary Health Insurance Schemes
  • General government revenues
  • None
  • Formal Sector
  • Premiums

The central Vietnamese government is responsible for financing the bulk of the cost. Provincial governments, however, also contribute a smaller percentage of funds to the program. Poor beneficiaries do not pay premiums and are exempt from copayments. The entire cost of the scheme, 4.5% of minimum wage, is covered by revenues from the state budget.

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The central Vietnamese government is responsible for financing the bulk of the cost. Provincial governments, however, also contribute a smaller percentage of funds to the program. Poor beneficiaries do not pay premiums and are exempt from copayments. The entire cost of the scheme, 4.5% of minimum wage, is covered by revenues from the state budget.

Funding for Vietnam’s various universal coverage schemes varies greatly by population segment. The following presents an overview of each program’s financing:

Compulsory program (CHI)

  • Pensioners: 4.5% of monthly allowances, paid by VSS with subsidies from state budget.
  • Meritorious persons, etc.: 4.5% of minimum wage, paid from state budget.
  • Formal sector workers and civil servants: 4.53% salary, 1.5% paid by worker, 3% by employer.
  • Insurance for the Poor: 4.5% of minimum wage, paid from state budget.
  • Voluntary program (VHI): 4.5% of minimum wage.

Note that when the insurance program was initially introduced, there was no cost sharing. In 1998, cost sharing was introduced, with a 20 percent coinsurance rate but no deductible. In 2005, the 20 percent coinsurance rate was eliminated, only to be reintroduced again since January 1, 2010. Copayment is exempted for some groups, such as people of merit.

Estonia: Estonian Health Insurance Fund
  • Payroll Tax
  • Formal Sector
  • Government Employees
  • Premiums
  • Co-payments

Estonian health care is funded through a Social Health Insurance regime where contributions are paid by salaried and self-employed workers, who contribute 13% of their wages to the system. The earmarked payroll tax is collected by the Estonian Tax and Customs Board. The tax board then transfers the health contribution to the EHIF. This system has a strong element of solidarity, as 46% of enrollees are non-contributing members and are subsidized by those who contribute. All enrollees are entitled to the same benefits package.

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Estonian health care is funded through a Social Health Insurance regime where contributions are paid by salaried and self-employed workers, who contribute 13% of their wages to the system. The earmarked payroll tax is collected by the Estonian Tax and Customs Board. The tax board then transfers the health contribution to the EHIF. This system has a strong element of solidarity, as 46% of enrollees are non-contributing members and are subsidized by those who contribute. All enrollees are entitled to the same benefits package.

The Estonian Health Insurance Fund is the primary financing entity. It is responsible for pooling funds, contracting with service providers, reimbursing health services and pharmaceuticals, and reimbursing sick leave and maternity benefits. In 2006, approximately 20% of EHIF expenditures went toward cash benefits such as health related work incapacity compensation, as well as dental care and prescription reimbursements. In the same year, approximately 70% of expenditures went toward payment of services such as preventative and curative health and pharmaceuticals and medical devices. EHIF also funds disease prevention and health promotion programs.

Funds are disbursed to the four regional EHIF offices on a per capita basis based on the number of insured in the region. The per capita payments for primary care are adjusted based on the age structure of the region, but payments for all other health services are not adjusted. Once the regional EHIF offices receive their funds, they have some flexibility in their allocation. This is especially useful, as the planning of health service provider contracts is conducted by the regional offices.

The EHIF is liable for all of its obligations, so it cannot declare bankruptcy. However, if social health insurance revenues are lower than budgeted, the state becomes responsible for the shortfall. Also, if the government establishes prices such that the EHIF cannot meet its contractual obligations, then the state becomes responsible. In order to ensure solvency, the EHIF has a cash reserve to manage daily cash flows, a legal reserve to decrease the risk of macroeconomic changes, equivalent to 6% of the budget, and a risk reserve to ensure that health insurance obligations are met, equivalent to 2% of the budget. EHIF revenues have exceeded expenditures every year since the reforms except 1999, when an economic crisis significantly reduced revenues.

Estonian Health Financing Flows

Out-of-Pocket payments have been the most rapidly increasing sources of financing, increasing from 7.5% of total health financing in 1995 to 24% in 2006. OOP payments flow mainly toward cost sharing for EHIF benefits, payments for services outside of the EHIF benefits package, payments to non-EHIF providers, and to informal payments. However, the primary reason for the increase in OOP has been the dual increase in pharmaceutical use and dental care expenditures that are not a part of the benefits package.

Table 1: Share of Primary Sources of Health Care Financing (1995-2006)

Source of financing19952000200520062007
Public89.876.476.773.775.6
Taxes (state and municipal)12.410.410.511.211.4
Social health insurance77.466.066.262.564.2
Private7.523.323.025.623.3
OOP Payments7.519.720.423.821.9
Private health insurance0.01.00.31.10.3
Other0.02.62.30.71.1
External sources2.70.30.30.61.1

Source: Ministry of Social Affairs, 1999-2006

There are no copayments for family doctor visits, but other services have small copayments. Prescription drugs normally have a deductible as well as a coinsurance of percentage. Flat small copayments are charged on family doctor home visits, outpatient care visits, and hospital bed days. There has been a gradual move toward an elimination of patient cost sharing for primary care. Outpatient specialist care has a maximum consultation fee, but providers can choose to charge any amount up to the maximum. Inpatient care providers can charge a per diem rate (maximum is set by EHIF) for up to ten days. However, inpatient child care, pregnancies, and emergency care are exempt from this per diem rate.

Colombia: General System of Social Security in Health
  • Payroll Tax
  • General government revenues
  • Employer contributions
  • Formal Sector
  • Government Employees
  • Informal Sector
  • Premiums
  • Co-payments

Two different funding streams for insurance currently exist within the Colombian health system. The Contributive Regime (CR) relies on wage contributions for its sustainability. The Subsidized Regime (SR), however, relies on three distinct funding mechanisms.

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Two different funding streams for insurance currently exist within the Colombian health system. The Contributive Regime (CR) relies on wage contributions for its sustainability. The Subsidized Regime (SR), however, relies on three distinct funding mechanisms.

Under the CR, employees and the self-employed (informal workers above a set income threshold) pay 12.5% of their salaries to EPSs, which are then responsible for transferring the funds to FOSYGA. In turn, FOSYGA remits a UPC back to the EPS to cover the premium of the insured. The UPC initially adjusted risk based on three variables: age, gender, and geographic location. The premium and risk adjusters are modified yearly by the National Board of Health Social Security (CNSSS). By 2006 the board had introduced risk adjusters for End-Stage Renal Disease and other adjusters have been introduced since. When patients receive services, the EPS handles all payment transactions with the exception of copayments. From 2007 to 2008, CR revenues increased by 12.75%, which indicates an expansion of the CR and a move toward greater coverage.

There are three primary funding mechanisms for the SR: 1) national transfers from general taxation providing for 48% of SR resources, 2) solidarity contributions from the CR that are transferred by FOSYGA providing for 40%, and 3) district and municipal efforts providing for 11% of SR funds. National transfers are pooled under the Subsidized Regime’s System of General Participation (SGP) which is responsible for allocating resources to the different districts and municipalities across the country. The solidarity contribution from the CR is transferred by FOSYGA directly to the municipalities. The municipality then transfers the UPC to an EPSS of the patient’s choosing. In 1997 there were over 200 EPSS, but by 2005 there were only 43 EPSS, of which 28% were private for profit, 16% were private not-for-profit, 14% were public, 36% were community based, and 6% were for indigenous populations. The subsidized regime UPC is approximately 60% of the contributing regime UPC, which is in line with the reduced number of services offered within the SR. As with EPSs, the EPSS is responsible for payment transactions with service providers for their members.

Finally, supply-side subsidies to public hospitals/providers and public health programs are paid for by national transfers from general taxes. These funds flow into the SGP, which is then responsible for their disbursement.

Indonesia: Jamkesmas
  • General government revenues
  • None
  • All populations
  • Premiums
  • Co-payments

The Jamkesmas scheme is funded by the central government from general tax revenue. Beneficiaries are not responsible for premium payments nor are they charged a copayment at the time of visit.

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The Jamkesmas scheme is funded by the central government from general tax revenue. Beneficiaries are not responsible for premium payments nor are they charged a copayment at the time of visit.

A paramount question of importance in Indonesia is the solvency of the Jamkesmas program. Increasing utilization of health care will concurrently increase the cost of health insurance, particularly for the poorest populations covered by Jamkesmas as currently there is no co-payment provision within the program. While utilization of Puskesmas services has increased, the capacity of local service delivery may not be able to keep pace with increasing demands without further collaboration with private primary health care providers.

Currently, it is the responsibility of the local government to finance the gap between the actual cost of insuring its population and what the central government provides via Jamkesmas reimbursements. Without further support for the poorest localities, this growing responsibility will become more problematic. The central government recognizes this problem, and in order to continue to strive towards universal coverage, it is considering how it might introduce strategies to develop further approaches to co-finance service delivery at the local level.

The proposed funding requirements for the operational costs of preventive and promotive service delivery is under active consideration within the parliament at this time and known as the “BOK” fund.

Mali: Mutuelles
  • General government revenues
  • Member contributions
  • Informal Sector
  • Premiums
  • Co-payments

The intent of the social protection policy in Mali is to ensure fairness among the three systems in terms of the care that is covered, the government’s financial contribution, and the population, except of course for the indigent and retirees. The priority source for Mutuelle system resources will be membership dues. However, to boost the development of Mutuelles and to make coverage of the health risk universal for the majority of Malians in the interest of fairness, the government will make a financial contribution that aims to remedy the fact that the Mutuelle members have only a modest ability to contribute. This government contribution will be through a Mutuelle Support Fund.

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The intent of the social protection policy in Mali is to ensure fairness among the three systems in terms of the care that is covered, the government’s financial contribution, and the population, except of course for the indigent and retirees. The priority source for Mutuelle system resources will be membership dues. However, to boost the development of Mutuelles and to make coverage of the health risk universal for the majority of Malians in the interest of fairness, the government will make a financial contribution that aims to remedy the fact that the Mutuelle members have only a modest ability to contribute. This government contribution will be through a Mutuelle Support Fund.

Thus, the pilot phase will be funded from two sources: membership dues and the Mutuelle Support Fund financed by the government, the technical and financial partners, and the local and territorial governments. Membership dues will be used to pay expenses incurred at the community health center level. By contrast, the Support Fund will be used to pay for expenses in the referral facilities, which are the referring health centers and the hospitals, in order to fund investments made for implementing the strategy.

Table 2: Financing planned under the social protection system in Mali, 2010

SystemFinancingShareCoverage rate
Mandatory Health InsuranceEmployer and employee contributionSalary-based:
Government: 4.48%
Civil servants, MPs, workers: 3.06%
Private sector employers: 3.50%
Retirees: 0.75%
70% of outpatient care
80% of hospitalization costs
RAMEDGovernment and territorial grantsGovernment: 65%
Territorial governments: 35%
100%
MutuellesGovernment grants/Territorial governments and Mutuelle member duesGovernment: 50% of dues
Mutuelle member: 50% of dues
In general:
70% of outpatient care
80% of hospitalization costs

Source: Ministry of Social Protection

The different members of the AMO thus pay the same membership dues (except for retirees), and the members and their beneficiaries are eligible for the same baskets of care. A trial period of six consecutive months after the right to benefits begins is mandatory, which is not the case for RAMED.

RAMED provides the right to direct and full payment of the costs of care. The government’s contribution to funding RAMED is written into the finance law.Theoretically, the contribution from the territorial governments should also be included in their annual budgets.

Ghana: National Health Insurance Scheme (NHIS)
  • General government revenues
  • Payroll Tax
  • Member contributions
  • Donor funding
  • Formal Sector
  • Government Employees
  • Informal Sector
  • Premiums

The NHIF is financed from several different sources. Approximately 70% of total funding comes from a health insurance levy added to VAT, 23% comes from contributions made by formal sector workers to the Social Security and National Trust (SSNIT), and 5% comes from Premium payments. Members do not pay deductibles or copayments when accessing health care.

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The NHIF is financed from several different sources. Approximately 70% of total funding comes from a health insurance levy added to VAT, 23% comes from contributions made by formal sector workers to the Social Security and National Trust (SSNIT), and 5% comes from Premium payments. Members do not pay deductibles or copayments when accessing health care.

Each funding source is described in further detail below:

  • A 2.5% health insurance levy added to VAT
  • 2.5% of the 17.5% Social Security and National Trust (SSNIT) contribution made by formal sector employees (the 17.5% contribution is made up of a 12.5% contribution from employers and 5% contribution from employees)
  • Member premiums of between 7.20 to 48.00 Ghana cedis annually (USD5.00 – USD34.00)
  • Money that accrues to the fund from investments made by the NHIC Other:
  • Funds allocated to the scheme by the Government of Ghana via Parliament
  • The central exemptions fund, formerly used to provide exemptions from user fees for those classed as ‘indigent’
  • Donor funds (few details on these donor funds are available)

The NHIS is a hybrid of social and community based health insurance models. The basic structure of the NHIS is described as a “hub-satellite” model. The “hub” of the system, which is essentially based on the SHI model of pooled public tax resources, is the National Health Insurance Fund (NHIF) which is administered by the National Health Insurance Authority (NHIA). The “satellites” are a country wide network of CBHI schemes known as District Wide Mutual Health Insurance (DWMHI) schemes which are monitored, subsidized and re-insured by the “hub.”

The table below presents estimates and projections for the composition of NHIS income from 2008 to 2018.

200820092010201120122018
SSNIT members58.8659.5176.8294.41117.86327.03
Health insurance levy176.56213.64256.37302.52352.44836.70
Insurance premiums (DMHIS)13.0520.8927.5335.7745.63171.46
Investment income5.5348.5351.0449.5645.070.00
Other income0.050.050.070.080.090.24
Total254.05342.63411.94482.76561.991,335.43

At present, employers are not held to anything in terms of contributions other than ensuring the necessary SSNIT deductions are made from the payrolls of formal sector employees. However, the NHIC has apparently made it known that it would prefer employers to contribute a sum equal to that of the employee’s contribution.

The NHIA has set the DWMHI annual premium levels at a minimum of 7.20 Ghana cedis and a maximum of 48.00 Ghana cedis (approximately $5-$34 in 2009) per adult member, to be determined by income status. The NHIA website states that this can be paid as a lump sum, or in 12 monthly installments (www.nhis.gov.gh). In practice, varying flat premiums are paid by districts across the country, with rich districts paying higher than poor districts.

The recent return to power of the NDC in the 2008/2009 elections may signal a significant change in the premium structure, however. The new government is considering the possibility of instituting a one-time premium that would guarantee access to the NHIS for life. Although no definite figures have been given as yet, rumor has it that the life time premium may be in the range of 150 Ghana cedis (just over $100), although the figure of $10-12 is also heard.

Philippines: PhilHealth
  • General government revenues
  • Member contributions
  • Formal Sector
  • Premiums

Funding for the scheme varies based on the population covered, although the majority of funds flow from general taxation. Premiums for the formal sector are set by law to be up to 3% of monthly income. Premiums for both the poor and the informal sector are 1,200 pesos annually (about 25 USD).

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Funding for the scheme varies based on the population covered, although the majority of funds flow from general taxation. Premiums for the formal sector are set by law to be up to 3% of monthly income. Premiums for both the poor and the informal sector are 1,200 pesos annually (about 25 USD). However, the cost of insurance for the poor is fully subsidized by the central and local governments.

Funding by population is as follows:

  • Formal sector: Employer and the employee split the required premium 50/50%.
  • Indigents: Central and local governments fully subsidize, with local governments contributing (on average) 25% of the premium and national government contributing (on average) 75% of the premium.
  • Retirees: Lifetime free membership for those who are 60 years old and older and have paid 10 years worth of premiums during employment in the formal sector.
  • Non-poor, Overseas Filipino Workers (OFWs), and others not eligible for other three categories: Premiums paid by individuals, referred to as the individual paying program (IPP).

Both national and local governments are responsible for the full subsidy for indigents. A recent policy proposal is for the national government to fully pay the subsidy in order to accelerate the efforts towards universal coverage by enrolling the poorest. However, this proposal has not been approved and the current cost-sharing scheme remains. Currently, the local government identifies and determines who is poor, then enrolls them in the national health insurance program. Once enrolled, the national government is expected to pay its counterpart. The central government cost-sharing percentage depends on the income level of the local government, but on average local governments contribute 25% and the national government contributes 75%.

All premiums are pooled nationally and in effect, there is cross-subsidization across districts. The frequency of premium contributions varies by each population category. For example, formal sector payroll collections naturally occur monthly, while for the non-poor, premium contributions occur based on when individuals seek to enroll. For OFWs, the premium is collected upon departure from the country and then on an annual basis. For the poor subsidized by the government, enrollment occurs annually and the local government pays quarterly while the national government is billed as soon as enough local governments have enrolled their poor. National government payment is dependent on the availability of funds.

Premiums for formal sector are set by law to be up to 3% of the monthly income. However, the current level is 2.5%, applied up to the first 30,000 pesos of income (i.e., all people earning up to or more than 30,000 pesos pay the same premium, while people with salaries under 30,000 pesos pay less). The premium of 1,200 pesos annually for the poor and informal sector has been the same for more than 9 years. The rate for the OFWs was 900 pesos annually until two years ago when it was increased to 1,200 pesos.

Mexico: Seguro Popular
  • General government revenues
  • Member contributions
  • Informal Sector
  • Premiums

The SP is financed by the federal government, the state government, and enrollees. The federal and state governments fund a social solidarity contribution while enrolled families contribute a premium that is tied to income. Families in the two lowest income deciles and those in the third lowest decile with a child under five years of age are not required to contribute, conditional on their participation in health promotion activities. Annual family contributions range from $60 USD for families in the third lowest decile to $950 USD for families in the highest decile. Family premiums are collected at the state level, where they remain to be used to fund the essential benefits package.

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The SP is financed by the federal government, the state government, and enrollees. The federal and state governments fund a social solidarity contribution while enrolled families contribute a premium that is tied to income. Families in the two lowest income deciles and those in the third lowest decile with a child under five years of age are not required to contribute, conditional on their participation in health promotion activities. Annual family contributions range from $60 USD for families in the third lowest decile to $950 USD for families in the highest decile. Family premiums are collected at the state level, where they remain to be used to fund the essential benefits package.

Federal funding for the SP takes the form of two distinct contributions to the states—the social contribution and the solidarity contribution. The social contribution by the federal government is a fixed allocation per enrolled family and is periodically adjusted for inflation. The SP federal contribution comes from general taxes. The federal solidarity contribution is meant to redress the large differences in development between the states. It is 1.5 times the social contribution and is generally larger for poorer states. The solidarity contribution is based on a formula that considers a per family fixed component, a health-needs adjusted component, a component aimed at promoting additional state contributions, and a component based on health system performance. The goal of this resource transfer mechanism is to make up for historical imbalances and inequities, to respond to the needs of different population groups, and to provide incentives for performance and affiliation. The formula weights and the indicators used in the formula are updated annually.

The state contribution is similar in all the states, equaling approximately half of the federal social contribution. The family contribution is determined on a sliding-scale, with the goal that no family should contribute more than a fair share based on its ability to pay. Ability to pay has been defined as disposable income, which is total household spending minus spending on food. The family contribution equals a fixed proportion of disposable income, with a maximum of 5%. Income deciles three through nine have a nominal contribution, while the tenth decile has two levels of contribution due to the variable nature of the income distribution. As of 2008, 97% of families made no premium contributions. Likewise, states have also failed to pay their full share of the premium.

  Seguro Popular Budget by Type of Contribution, 2004-2007

The framework of the reform creates certain paradoxes in its implementation. The percentage of families that are eligible to enroll in SP varies by state. The population of the northern industrialized states tends to have high levels of social security membership, whereas the population of poor southern states tends to have low levels of social security membership. This means that poor states with weak tax-based incomes must enroll a much higher percentage of their population out of state coffers compared to rich states with stronger tax bases. This appears to perpetuate inequality in health care delivery on a geographical basis. Because poorer states have the largest proportion of both the poor and the uninsured, and because the state contributions to the SP are established on a per-enrolled family basis, poorer states have to make a higher contribution than wealthier states, leading to increased geographical inequity. Therefore, federal resources are based on both a per-enrolled family fee plus a solidarity supplement for poorer states to help mitigate some of the adverse budgetary effects that stem from a large population of poor households.

The National Commission for Social Protection in Health (CNPSS) has established that states must target a maximum of 30% of their resources to purchase medications, 40% to contract personnel, and 20% for activities of health promotion, early detection, and prevention. Once the requirements for the transfer of resources have been met, funds are sent to the State Finances Secretariat. Before 2007, funds were transferred directly to the State Health Secretariats. The change was established due to the reporting requirements of the State Finance Secretariats, leading to increased transparency, as well as improving the registration and use of resources at the state level. Resources are transferred to the states every three months.

Since 2004, resources transferred to the Social Health Protection System have increased by an average of 11.5% annually in real terms, thereby reducing the gap between IMSS health expenditures and the expenditures of the Ministry of Health.

  Health Spending by the Ministry of Health and the Social Security Institutions, 2000-2010

From 2001 to 2003, the growth rate in per capita expenditures on public health for the uninsured population averaged 5.2%. Conversely, during the first few years of the reform from 2004 to 2006, this growth rate nearly doubled to 12.3% per year. From 2001 to 2006, public expenditure for the uninsured increased by 61% overall. Since the implementation of SP, public health expenditure increased from 43.8% of total health expenditure in 2002 to 46.4% in 2006. This trend of growing public health expenditures is expected to continue.

Thailand: Universal Coverage Scheme
  • General government revenues
  • None
  • None

The Universal Coverage Scheme (UCS) is financed through general tax revenues paid to local contracting units on the basis of population size. The UCS reform raised public health spending from about 66.25 billion Baht in 2000-01 to 72.78 billion Baht in 2001-02. In recent years, the government has responded to criticisms claiming that UCS is underfinanced by raising the budget for the scheme.

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The Universal Coverage Scheme (UCS) is financed through general tax revenues paid to local contracting units on the basis of population size. The UCS reform raised public health spending from about 66.25 billion Baht in 2000-01 to 72.78 billion Baht in 2001-02. In recent years, the government has responded to criticisms claiming that UCS is underfinanced by raising the budget for the scheme.

General tax revenue was decided as the source of funding for the UCS because of the political urgency and focus on nationwide scale-up. The target population for the scheme is largely in the informal, agricultural sector and does do not have access to consistent cash income for any kind of regular premium payment, therefore making premium collection difficult.

A copayment of Baht 30 was also implemented. This copayment was exempted for low income people, children below 12 years old and the elderly (i.e., those above 60 years old). While this copayment did not reflect the marginal cost of interventions, it did prevent overuse.

The 30 Baht copayment was abolished in November 2006 for political reasons. However, abolition of the 30 Baht copayment had no effect on overall utilization of out-patient services. This is likely because the majority of beneficiaries have been already exempted from the copayment.

The UCS reform raised public health spending from about 66.25 billion Baht in 2000-01 to 72.78 billion Baht in 2001-02. Thus, the reform cost US $175 million. The overall budget for UCS has increased to 82.02 billion (18%) and 91.36 billion (10%) in the years 2006 and 2007 respectively.

Co-financing arrangements for the scheme are currently being considered—for example, one proposal suggests partial or non-subsidization of medical care costs for beneficiaries who decide to stay in a private room.