The Joint Learning Network for Universal Health Coverage systematically documents the reforms of its member countries and other countries that have expanded health coverage through demand-side financing. The case studies contained in these pages are brief, comparative and modular in nature, describing the key highlights and technical features of each program.
Compare various dimensions of country reform efforts using our interactive tool.
| Program | Provider Payment Mechanisms | Provider payment mechanisms |
|---|---|---|
| Estonia: Estonian Health Insurance Fund |
|
The EHIF negotiates capped cost and volume contracts with hospitals at the start of each year. These contracts contain provisions on service quality and access, as well as an extended cost and volume section. The contracting process begins with a needs assessment based on historical data regarding health service utilization along with existing waiting times. The EHIF does not have to contract with all providers. Still most of the services are purchased from hospital master plan hospitals with which EHIF has contracts. A small amount of funds go to selective contracting which provides private providers the opportunity to get some health insurance funding. These private providers, however, tend to be primarily funded through OOP payments. A large part of the standard contract conditions are negotiated with the Hospital Association, but there are also financial appendices that are negotiated with each provider individually. Contracts are monitored quarterly using the Management Information System. Read full sectionThe EHIF negotiates capped cost and volume contracts with hospitals at the start of each year. These contracts contain provisions on service quality and access, as well as an extended cost and volume section. The contracting process begins with a needs assessment based on historical data regarding health service utilization along with existing waiting times. The EHIF does not have to contract with all providers. Still most of the services are purchased from hospital master plan hospitals with which EHIF has contracts. A small amount of funds go to selective contracting which provides private providers the opportunity to get some health insurance funding. These private providers, however, tend to be primarily funded through OOP payments. A large part of the standard contract conditions are negotiated with the Hospital Association, but there are also financial appendices that are negotiated with each provider individually. Contracts are monitored quarterly using the Management Information System.
Actual payment methods and prices are regulated in a single government health service list that lies outside of the contract negotiation process and which is updated at least once per year. All providers are paid the same prices. The list includes over 2,000 different items and a range of different payment methods. Outpatient care is normally paid on a fee-for-service basis and inpatient care is paid with a mix of fee-for-service, per diem, and diagnosis-related group (DRG) methods. Primary care family physicians are paid through per capita payments that are adjusted based on the age of the patients. If a family physician has fewer than 1,200 patients, he will still receive a capitation payment for 1,200 patients in order to cover fixed costs. Family physicians can also receive additional fee-for-service payments up to 32% of the capitation amount received. Contracts for family medicine are agreed to between the EHIF and the Estonian Association of Family Doctors. The financial stipulations of the contracts with particular family doctors are reviewed every quarter in order to align with changes in the number of patients on the practice list. Specialist care is also compensated using different types of payment methods depending on the services provided. These methods include fee-for-service, visit fees, per diem, diagnosis-related group, and case-based complex pricing. Since the 1990s, there has been a gradual move away from fee-for service toward case-based payments.
Estonian Health Insurance FundProvider payment mechanisms Provider Payment Mechanisms: Fee-for-service, Capitation, Diagnosis-Related Groups The EHIF negotiates capped cost and volume contracts with hospitals at the start of each year. These contracts contain provisions on service quality and access, as well as an extended cost and volume section. The contracting process begins with a needs assessment based on historical data regarding health service utilization along with existing waiting times. The EHIF does not have to contract with all providers. Still most of the services are purchased from hospital master plan hospitals with which EHIF has contracts. A small amount of funds go to selective contracting which provides private providers the opportunity to get some health insurance funding. These private providers, however, tend to be primarily funded through OOP payments. A large part of the standard contract conditions are negotiated with the Hospital Association, but there are also financial appendices that are negotiated with each provider individually. Contracts are monitored quarterly using the Management Information System.
Actual payment methods and prices are regulated in a single government health service list that lies outside of the contract negotiation process and which is updated at least once per year. All providers are paid the same prices. The list includes over 2,000 different items and a range of different payment methods. Outpatient care is normally paid on a fee-for-service basis and inpatient care is paid with a mix of fee-for-service, per diem, and diagnosis-related group (DRG) methods. Primary care family physicians are paid through per capita payments that are adjusted based on the age of the patients. If a family physician has fewer than 1,200 patients, he will still receive a capitation payment for 1,200 patients in order to cover fixed costs. Family physicians can also receive additional fee-for-service payments up to 32% of the capitation amount received. Contracts for family medicine are agreed to between the EHIF and the Estonian Association of Family Doctors. The financial stipulations of the contracts with particular family doctors are reviewed every quarter in order to align with changes in the number of patients on the practice list. Specialist care is also compensated using different types of payment methods depending on the services provided. These methods include fee-for-service, visit fees, per diem, diagnosis-related group, and case-based complex pricing. Since the 1990s, there has been a gradual move away from fee-for service toward case-based payments.
|
| Kyrgyz Republic: Mandatory Health Insurance Fund (MHIF) |
|
Outpatient care is funded through capitation-based payments while hospital services are funded through case-based payments. The capitation formula for primary care is adjusted by coefficients for rural, small towns, and mountainous areas. This leads to cross-subsidization across geographical boundaries. Read full sectionOutpatient care is funded through capitation-based payments while hospital services are funded through case-based payments. The capitation formula for primary care is adjusted by coefficients for rural, small towns, and mountainous areas. This leads to cross-subsidization across geographical boundaries. The base primary care capitation rate (before adjustment coefficients) is based on two variables, the estimated number of enrollees that are expected to be enrolled in a family group practice over the coming year, and the size of the budget. The case-based payments for hospital services introduced the idea of output-based payments to the Kyrgyz health system. The system for grouping cases, generally called clinical statistical groups, was based on American diagnosis-related-groups, but was created with Kyrgyz utilization and cost data. This new system enabled an expansion of the budget management autonomy of hospital administrators, although hospital autonomy and management capacity is still an issue on the reform agenda. The republican MHIF and its territorial branches administer the national pool of funds for the SGBP and are responsible for making all case- and capitation-based payments. Per-case payment rates are defined prospectively but payments are made on a monthly basis. In order to avoid provider selection, providers receive higher payments for treating exempt patients and those with lower copayments. A key to the success of the MHIF as the single-payer for the SGBP has been the continuous development and refinement of financial and clinical information systems to operate the provider payment systems and ensure good financial reporting and fiduciary risk mitigation. Mandatory Health Insurance Fund (MHIF)Provider payment mechanisms Provider Payment Mechanisms: Capitation, Diagnosis-Related Groups Outpatient care is funded through capitation-based payments while hospital services are funded through case-based payments. The capitation formula for primary care is adjusted by coefficients for rural, small towns, and mountainous areas. This leads to cross-subsidization across geographical boundaries. The base primary care capitation rate (before adjustment coefficients) is based on two variables, the estimated number of enrollees that are expected to be enrolled in a family group practice over the coming year, and the size of the budget. The case-based payments for hospital services introduced the idea of output-based payments to the Kyrgyz health system. The system for grouping cases, generally called clinical statistical groups, was based on American diagnosis-related-groups, but was created with Kyrgyz utilization and cost data. This new system enabled an expansion of the budget management autonomy of hospital administrators, although hospital autonomy and management capacity is still an issue on the reform agenda. The republican MHIF and its territorial branches administer the national pool of funds for the SGBP and are responsible for making all case- and capitation-based payments. Per-case payment rates are defined prospectively but payments are made on a monthly basis. In order to avoid provider selection, providers receive higher payments for treating exempt patients and those with lower copayments. A key to the success of the MHIF as the single-payer for the SGBP has been the continuous development and refinement of financial and clinical information systems to operate the provider payment systems and ensure good financial reporting and fiduciary risk mitigation. |
| : Taiwan: National Health Insurance |
|
Providers obtain their revenues from 3 sources: 1) payments by the NHI; 2) patient user fees and co-payments; and 3) proceeds from the sale of products and services not covered by the NHI. The government acts as the single-payer system with a uniform payment schedule that has effectively controlled the cost shifting that occurred frequently before the implementation of NHI. Read full sectionProviders obtain their revenues from 3 sources: 1) payments by the NHI; 2) patient user fees and co-payments; and 3) proceeds from the sale of products and services not covered by the NHI. The government acts as the single-payer system with a uniform payment schedule that has effectively controlled the cost shifting that occurred frequently before the implementation of NHI. Initially, NHI providers were paid on a fee-for-service basis, however providers were able to make sizable profits by overprescribing medications and ordering unnecessary procedures, leading to quickly rising per person expenditures. Hospitals in Taiwan reward their staff physicians individually for bringing in revenue, known as a “professional fee,” further encouraging physician-induced over-prescription. The Bureau of National Health Insurance (BNHI) estimates that overuse and misuse of health care may constitute up to a third of BNHI’s expenditures. Facing the need for cost containment, BNHI introduced a reasonable volume standard for outpatient visits coupled with a sliding fee schedule for visits above the volume standard, which discouraged supply-induced demand and reduced the number of visits per person. BNHI also reduced the high profit margin that clinics and hospitals can obtain from dispensing drugs by reducing the reimbursement rates for drugs, using reference pricing, and encouraging the use of generic drugs. The NHI experimented with different payment systems, such as diagnosis-related groups (DRGs) for hospitals, primary care capitation for certain population groups, and even performance-based payments. DRGs were phased in for the 50 most common diseases and treatments, which effectively reduced the average length-of-stay in hospitals. The ultimate cost control measure, however, has been the imposition of global budgets for hospital outpatient and inpatient services in 2002. This remains highly controversial because global budgeting incorporates an aggregate fixed sum budget imposed on all hospitals in Taiwan collectively, creating a zero-sum game in which the players cannot effectively police one another. Reimbursement contracts are negotiated with health care providers on a fee-for-service basis with a uniform pay schedule. A deflation mechanism engages once a service quota is reached, resulting in declining reimbursement rates. Under the global budget payment system, the NHI Medical Expenditure Negotiation Committee convenes and negotiates overall caps on total medical payments based on a set of equations and indicators prior to the beginning of a fiscal year. Along with the implementation of global budgets, the NHI took several measures to control the demand for selected types of health care, such as increasing copayments for high users of drugs and outpatient services. The global budget payment system with these measures has been successful in containing the annual growth in the health insurance system's expenditures with spending growth leveling out at below 5% a year since it was fully implemented in July 2002. National Health InsuranceProvider payment mechanisms Provider Payment Mechanisms: Fee-for-service, Diagnosis-Related Groups, Global budgets Providers obtain their revenues from 3 sources: 1) payments by the NHI; 2) patient user fees and co-payments; and 3) proceeds from the sale of products and services not covered by the NHI. The government acts as the single-payer system with a uniform payment schedule that has effectively controlled the cost shifting that occurred frequently before the implementation of NHI. Initially, NHI providers were paid on a fee-for-service basis, however providers were able to make sizable profits by overprescribing medications and ordering unnecessary procedures, leading to quickly rising per person expenditures. Hospitals in Taiwan reward their staff physicians individually for bringing in revenue, known as a “professional fee,” further encouraging physician-induced over-prescription. The Bureau of National Health Insurance (BNHI) estimates that overuse and misuse of health care may constitute up to a third of BNHI’s expenditures. Facing the need for cost containment, BNHI introduced a reasonable volume standard for outpatient visits coupled with a sliding fee schedule for visits above the volume standard, which discouraged supply-induced demand and reduced the number of visits per person. BNHI also reduced the high profit margin that clinics and hospitals can obtain from dispensing drugs by reducing the reimbursement rates for drugs, using reference pricing, and encouraging the use of generic drugs. The NHI experimented with different payment systems, such as diagnosis-related groups (DRGs) for hospitals, primary care capitation for certain population groups, and even performance-based payments. DRGs were phased in for the 50 most common diseases and treatments, which effectively reduced the average length-of-stay in hospitals. The ultimate cost control measure, however, has been the imposition of global budgets for hospital outpatient and inpatient services in 2002. This remains highly controversial because global budgeting incorporates an aggregate fixed sum budget imposed on all hospitals in Taiwan collectively, creating a zero-sum game in which the players cannot effectively police one another. Reimbursement contracts are negotiated with health care providers on a fee-for-service basis with a uniform pay schedule. A deflation mechanism engages once a service quota is reached, resulting in declining reimbursement rates. Under the global budget payment system, the NHI Medical Expenditure Negotiation Committee convenes and negotiates overall caps on total medical payments based on a set of equations and indicators prior to the beginning of a fiscal year. Along with the implementation of global budgets, the NHI took several measures to control the demand for selected types of health care, such as increasing copayments for high users of drugs and outpatient services. The global budget payment system with these measures has been successful in containing the annual growth in the health insurance system's expenditures with spending growth leveling out at below 5% a year since it was fully implemented in July 2002. |
| Mexico: Seguro Popular |
|
The interventions included in the CAUSES are paid for by capitation. Meanwhile, the interventions carried out under the FPGC are paid for on a per-case basis. The payment mechanism for contracts with private providers is vague. The reform stated that health services should be provided by state health secretariats in accordance with the state of residence of the insured family or by other public health institutions that have contracted with the state health secretariats. After the passage of the law, however, the executive branch issued a by-law that introduced the option of contracting with the private sector. The problem with this by-law is that it does not specify the form that payments to private sector will take. Thus, such payments take place on an ad-hoc, non-systematic basis. Read full sectionThe interventions included in the CAUSES are paid for by capitation. Meanwhile, the interventions carried out under the FPGC are paid for on a per-case basis. The payment mechanism for contracts with private providers is vague. The reform stated that health services should be provided by state health secretariats in accordance with the state of residence of the insured family or by other public health institutions that have contracted with the state health secretariats. After the passage of the law, however, the executive branch issued a by-law that introduced the option of contracting with the private sector. The problem with this by-law is that it does not specify the form that payments to private sector will take. Thus, such payments take place on an ad-hoc, non-systematic basis. Seguro PopularProvider payment mechanisms Provider Payment Mechanisms: Fee-for-service, Capitation, Diagnosis-Related Groups The interventions included in the CAUSES are paid for by capitation. Meanwhile, the interventions carried out under the FPGC are paid for on a per-case basis. The payment mechanism for contracts with private providers is vague. The reform stated that health services should be provided by state health secretariats in accordance with the state of residence of the insured family or by other public health institutions that have contracted with the state health secretariats. After the passage of the law, however, the executive branch issued a by-law that introduced the option of contracting with the private sector. The problem with this by-law is that it does not specify the form that payments to private sector will take. Thus, such payments take place on an ad-hoc, non-systematic basis. |
