The Joint Learning Network for Universal Health Coverage systematically documents the reforms of its member countries and other countries that have expanded health coverage through demand-side financing. The case studies contained in these pages are brief, comparative and modular in nature, describing the key highlights and technical features of each program.
Compare various dimensions of country reform efforts using our interactive tool.
| Program | Provider Payment Mechanisms | Provider payment mechanisms |
|---|---|---|
| Vietnam: Compulsory and Voluntary Health Insurance Schemes |
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Although there has been some innovation in provider reimbursement over the past few years, fee-for-service (FFS) remains the dominant payment mechanism. Rates are set by the fee schedule, and have remained unchanged since the schedule was created in 1995. Read full sectionAlthough there has been some innovation in provider reimbursement over the past few years, fee-for-service (FFS) remains the dominant payment mechanism. Rates are set by the fee schedule, and have remained unchanged since the schedule was created in 1995. In light of concerns that FFS payments encourage providers to treat patients more than is clinically necessary, the Vietnamese government has begun exploring alternative methods of payment. Additionally, an incentive-based structure for providers has been put in place that has tied provider payment to the financial performance of the facility. The FFS rates were created by an interministerial commission consisting of representatives from MoH, the Ministry of Finance (MoF), the Ministry of Labor, War Invalids, and Social Affairs (MOLISA) and the State Price Commission (SPC). The fees in the schedule are a mixture of per-item charges and per diem rates, with ranges for each type, and variations according to the type of hospital (higher class hospitals being able to charge more). With the exception of the addition of 1,022 new procedures in 2006, fees have been unchanged since the major initiative of 1995, not even to adjust for inflation. However, the government plans to update the fee schedule to reflect current rates. Note that drugs prices are not regulated by VSS (though they are monitored), and providers have the scope, in practice, to levy unofficial charges. The New Health Insurance Law 2008 provides for several different provider payment methods, including FFS, capitation, diagnostic-related group (DRG) or other modes of payment. Innovation in provider payment remains a top priority for reforms to improve the health insurance system. Beyond fees, Vietnam has an incentive structure for providers tied to the financial performance of their facility. Under Decree 33/1995, providers had limited ability to retain a portion (30%) of gross revenues from user fees. However, under this system, opportunities for incentive payments are highly variable based on the facility and the population they serve, and this structure had high potential for creating further imbalances in the system. This incentive structure has since been replaced by Decrees 10/2002 and 43/2006, which allow hospitals greater discretion over financial operations, management of human resources, organization of services, and choices of services offered. By providing greater autonomy to facilities over the management of their costs and revenues, the government hopes to better align the incentives of providers (hospital staff) with the overall financial performance of the health facility. Contracting between VSS and a health care provider is normally done for providers who operate as a separate legal entity. In effect, these are limited to provincial, central, and district level hospitals. Commune Health Centers (CHC) and inter-commune polyclinics can provide services to insured members but they are supervised by District Health Centers (DHC) and hence they do not possess a legal entity status to operate a bank account. VSS therefore cannot contract directly with them but must coordinate commune level health service provision under the supervision of the DHCs. With regard to quality control, the VSS plays little to no role in overseeing the quality of care. They serve primarily as the bill-payer and general orchestrator of the system. There are currently no clinical guidelines enforced by the MoH or VSS, and there is no credible quality assurance mechanism. Providers are largely free to treat patients as they choose. Compulsory and Voluntary Health Insurance SchemesProvider payment mechanisms Provider Payment Mechanisms: Fee-for-service Although there has been some innovation in provider reimbursement over the past few years, fee-for-service (FFS) remains the dominant payment mechanism. Rates are set by the fee schedule, and have remained unchanged since the schedule was created in 1995. In light of concerns that FFS payments encourage providers to treat patients more than is clinically necessary, the Vietnamese government has begun exploring alternative methods of payment. Additionally, an incentive-based structure for providers has been put in place that has tied provider payment to the financial performance of the facility. The FFS rates were created by an interministerial commission consisting of representatives from MoH, the Ministry of Finance (MoF), the Ministry of Labor, War Invalids, and Social Affairs (MOLISA) and the State Price Commission (SPC). The fees in the schedule are a mixture of per-item charges and per diem rates, with ranges for each type, and variations according to the type of hospital (higher class hospitals being able to charge more). With the exception of the addition of 1,022 new procedures in 2006, fees have been unchanged since the major initiative of 1995, not even to adjust for inflation. However, the government plans to update the fee schedule to reflect current rates. Note that drugs prices are not regulated by VSS (though they are monitored), and providers have the scope, in practice, to levy unofficial charges. The New Health Insurance Law 2008 provides for several different provider payment methods, including FFS, capitation, diagnostic-related group (DRG) or other modes of payment. Innovation in provider payment remains a top priority for reforms to improve the health insurance system. Beyond fees, Vietnam has an incentive structure for providers tied to the financial performance of their facility. Under Decree 33/1995, providers had limited ability to retain a portion (30%) of gross revenues from user fees. However, under this system, opportunities for incentive payments are highly variable based on the facility and the population they serve, and this structure had high potential for creating further imbalances in the system. This incentive structure has since been replaced by Decrees 10/2002 and 43/2006, which allow hospitals greater discretion over financial operations, management of human resources, organization of services, and choices of services offered. By providing greater autonomy to facilities over the management of their costs and revenues, the government hopes to better align the incentives of providers (hospital staff) with the overall financial performance of the health facility. Contracting between VSS and a health care provider is normally done for providers who operate as a separate legal entity. In effect, these are limited to provincial, central, and district level hospitals. Commune Health Centers (CHC) and inter-commune polyclinics can provide services to insured members but they are supervised by District Health Centers (DHC) and hence they do not possess a legal entity status to operate a bank account. VSS therefore cannot contract directly with them but must coordinate commune level health service provision under the supervision of the DHCs. With regard to quality control, the VSS plays little to no role in overseeing the quality of care. They serve primarily as the bill-payer and general orchestrator of the system. There are currently no clinical guidelines enforced by the MoH or VSS, and there is no credible quality assurance mechanism. Providers are largely free to treat patients as they choose. |
| Indonesia: Jamkesmas |
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While the Jamkesmas benefit package is standardized at the national level, districts are able to set the reimbursement rates for various services based on local conditions. Though the scheme initially utilized a fee-for-service reimbursement mechanism Jamkesmas began transitioning to a DRG provider payment system in 2009. All hospitals are being incorporated into the DRG payment process by the end of 2010. Read full sectionWhile the Jamkesmas benefit package is standardized at the national level, districts are able to set the reimbursement rates for various services based on local conditions. Though the scheme initially utilized a fee-for-service reimbursement mechanism Jamkesmas began transitioning to a DRG provider payment system in 2009. All hospitals are being incorporated into the DRG payment process by the end of 2010. Jamkesmas has “verificators” in every network hospital. These verificators have been put in place to assure reimbursements are made only for documentable claims with a full medical record. Verificators process claims and send them electronically to the MoH. Verificators have standard review procedures which they follow to document every case. These standards were developed by the MoH. Once the MoH receives the claim, it begins the reimbursement process to providers. While there has been broad experience with contracting public and private providers through the publically-funded schemes, the contract mechanisms have not used reimbursement or payment policies strategically to drive improvements in quality or efficiency. There are examples in maternal health where the current reimbursement system by Jamkesmas has created the wrong incentives for providers, such as not reimbursing midwives for pre-delivery care if there is post-partum hemorrhage. In addition, once a patient is referred to the hospital, the hospital receives a full reimbursement for delivery, while the midwife receives no fee, thereby discouraging midwives from referring patients to hospitals for complications as they would lose income. JamkesmasProvider payment mechanisms Provider Payment Mechanisms: Fee-for-service, Diagnosis-Related Groups While the Jamkesmas benefit package is standardized at the national level, districts are able to set the reimbursement rates for various services based on local conditions. Though the scheme initially utilized a fee-for-service reimbursement mechanism Jamkesmas began transitioning to a DRG provider payment system in 2009. All hospitals are being incorporated into the DRG payment process by the end of 2010. Jamkesmas has “verificators” in every network hospital. These verificators have been put in place to assure reimbursements are made only for documentable claims with a full medical record. Verificators process claims and send them electronically to the MoH. Verificators have standard review procedures which they follow to document every case. These standards were developed by the MoH. Once the MoH receives the claim, it begins the reimbursement process to providers. While there has been broad experience with contracting public and private providers through the publically-funded schemes, the contract mechanisms have not used reimbursement or payment policies strategically to drive improvements in quality or efficiency. There are examples in maternal health where the current reimbursement system by Jamkesmas has created the wrong incentives for providers, such as not reimbursing midwives for pre-delivery care if there is post-partum hemorrhage. In addition, once a patient is referred to the hospital, the hospital receives a full reimbursement for delivery, while the midwife receives no fee, thereby discouraging midwives from referring patients to hospitals for complications as they would lose income. |
| Rwanda: Mutuelles de Sante |
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The health insurance system in Rwanda has two main channels for financing: the demand side – the insurance programs, and the supply side – transfers from the treasury to districts and health facilities. On the demand side, services are financed through three main channels: demand-based user payments, demand-based payments from Mutuelles, and demand-based payments from RAMA and MMI. Read full sectionThe health insurance system in Rwanda has two main channels for financing: the demand side – the insurance programs, and the supply side – transfers from the treasury to districts and health facilities. On the demand side, services are financed through three main channels: demand-based user payments, demand-based payments from Mutuelles, and demand-based payments from RAMA and MMI.
On the supply side, financing flows from the central government towards health providers through multiple block grants, which provide hospitals with greater degrees of autonomy. A key issue on the supply-side financing is the equity of the needs based transfers against the historical criteria. The government hopes to progressively move towards increasing the importance of needs-based transfers and decreasing historical transfers.
A key issue on the supply-side financing is the equity of the needs based transfers against the historical criteria. The government hopes to progressively move towards increasing the importance of needs-based transfers and decreasing historical transfers. In addition, the substantial amount of donor funding incurs high overhead costs and involves a lack of clarity. Mutuelles de SanteProvider payment mechanisms Provider Payment Mechanisms: Fee-for-service, Capitation The health insurance system in Rwanda has two main channels for financing: the demand side – the insurance programs, and the supply side – transfers from the treasury to districts and health facilities. On the demand side, services are financed through three main channels: demand-based user payments, demand-based payments from Mutuelles, and demand-based payments from RAMA and MMI.
On the supply side, financing flows from the central government towards health providers through multiple block grants, which provide hospitals with greater degrees of autonomy. A key issue on the supply-side financing is the equity of the needs based transfers against the historical criteria. The government hopes to progressively move towards increasing the importance of needs-based transfers and decreasing historical transfers.
A key issue on the supply-side financing is the equity of the needs based transfers against the historical criteria. The government hopes to progressively move towards increasing the importance of needs-based transfers and decreasing historical transfers. In addition, the substantial amount of donor funding incurs high overhead costs and involves a lack of clarity. |
| Ghana: National Health Insurance Scheme (NHIS) |
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In 2004, a memorandum of understanding regarding the services covered and prices charged was signed by the NHIC and service provider representatives. Claims are filed by the health facilities and the district schemes pay providers on a DRG basis. Typically, a reimbursement check comes 6 months after a claim is submitted. Read full sectionIn 2004, a memorandum of understanding regarding the services covered and prices charged was signed by the NHIC and service provider representatives. Claims are filed by the health facilities and the district schemes pay providers on a DRG basis. Typically, a reimbursement check comes 6 months after a claim is submitted. This memorandum now forms the basis of all contracts between the health schemes and providers. Claims processing is a manual process, with some automation in enrollment verifications and claims documentation. The amount of the reimbursement is often less than 100%, with some schemes, for example, paying 70% (e.g., Ossu Kottery – urban scheme in higher income area of Accra), others paying as low as 40% (e.g., Dodowah, rural area outside Accra). The balance is supposed to be paid at later date. National Health Insurance Scheme (NHIS)Provider payment mechanisms Provider Payment Mechanisms: Diagnosis-Related Groups In 2004, a memorandum of understanding regarding the services covered and prices charged was signed by the NHIC and service provider representatives. Claims are filed by the health facilities and the district schemes pay providers on a DRG basis. Typically, a reimbursement check comes 6 months after a claim is submitted. This memorandum now forms the basis of all contracts between the health schemes and providers. Claims processing is a manual process, with some automation in enrollment verifications and claims documentation. The amount of the reimbursement is often less than 100%, with some schemes, for example, paying 70% (e.g., Ossu Kottery – urban scheme in higher income area of Accra), others paying as low as 40% (e.g., Dodowah, rural area outside Accra). The balance is supposed to be paid at later date. |
| Nigeria: National Health Insurance System |
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Patients are allowed to choose their primary provider from the list of accredited facilities, which includes both public and private providers. The provider network is used for access and secondary referrals, which acts to control costs and maintain viability of the system. Provider payment mechanisms are primarily determined by the National Health Insurance System (NHIS) Governing Council. Read full sectionPatients are allowed to choose their primary provider from the list of accredited facilities, which includes both public and private providers. The provider network is used for access and secondary referrals, which acts to control costs and maintain viability of the system. Provider payment mechanisms are primarily determined by the National Health Insurance System (NHIS) Governing Council. For private insurers, this is determined between HMOs and Providers, with oversight from the central government, and referral to specialist care follows guidelines that are managed accordingly. Decree 35 determined that the only lawful payment systems to be included in NHIS are capitation, fee-for-service, per diem, or case payment. A capitation system is the predominant form of provider payment used to pay primary healthcare facilities, while secondary and tertiary healthcare facilities are paid by fee for service and per diem. National Health Insurance SystemProvider payment mechanisms Provider Payment Mechanisms: Fee-for-service, Capitation Patients are allowed to choose their primary provider from the list of accredited facilities, which includes both public and private providers. The provider network is used for access and secondary referrals, which acts to control costs and maintain viability of the system. Provider payment mechanisms are primarily determined by the National Health Insurance System (NHIS) Governing Council. For private insurers, this is determined between HMOs and Providers, with oversight from the central government, and referral to specialist care follows guidelines that are managed accordingly. Decree 35 determined that the only lawful payment systems to be included in NHIS are capitation, fee-for-service, per diem, or case payment. A capitation system is the predominant form of provider payment used to pay primary healthcare facilities, while secondary and tertiary healthcare facilities are paid by fee for service and per diem. |