The Joint Learning Network for Universal Health Coverage systematically documents the reforms of its member countries and other countries that have expanded health coverage through demand-side financing. The case studies contained in these pages are brief, comparative and modular in nature, describing the key highlights and technical features of each program.
Compare various dimensions of country reform efforts using our interactive tool.
| Program | Provider Payment Mechanisms | Provider payment mechanisms |
|---|---|---|
| Vietnam: Compulsory and Voluntary Health Insurance Schemes |
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Although there has been some innovation in provider reimbursement over the past few years, fee-for-service (FFS) remains the dominant payment mechanism. Rates are set by the fee schedule, and have remained unchanged since the schedule was created in 1995. Read full sectionAlthough there has been some innovation in provider reimbursement over the past few years, fee-for-service (FFS) remains the dominant payment mechanism. Rates are set by the fee schedule, and have remained unchanged since the schedule was created in 1995. In light of concerns that FFS payments encourage providers to treat patients more than is clinically necessary, the Vietnamese government has begun exploring alternative methods of payment. Additionally, an incentive-based structure for providers has been put in place that has tied provider payment to the financial performance of the facility. The FFS rates were created by an interministerial commission consisting of representatives from MoH, the Ministry of Finance (MoF), the Ministry of Labor, War Invalids, and Social Affairs (MOLISA) and the State Price Commission (SPC). The fees in the schedule are a mixture of per-item charges and per diem rates, with ranges for each type, and variations according to the type of hospital (higher class hospitals being able to charge more). With the exception of the addition of 1,022 new procedures in 2006, fees have been unchanged since the major initiative of 1995, not even to adjust for inflation. However, the government plans to update the fee schedule to reflect current rates. Note that drugs prices are not regulated by VSS (though they are monitored), and providers have the scope, in practice, to levy unofficial charges. The New Health Insurance Law 2008 provides for several different provider payment methods, including FFS, capitation, diagnostic-related group (DRG) or other modes of payment. Innovation in provider payment remains a top priority for reforms to improve the health insurance system. Beyond fees, Vietnam has an incentive structure for providers tied to the financial performance of their facility. Under Decree 33/1995, providers had limited ability to retain a portion (30%) of gross revenues from user fees. However, under this system, opportunities for incentive payments are highly variable based on the facility and the population they serve, and this structure had high potential for creating further imbalances in the system. This incentive structure has since been replaced by Decrees 10/2002 and 43/2006, which allow hospitals greater discretion over financial operations, management of human resources, organization of services, and choices of services offered. By providing greater autonomy to facilities over the management of their costs and revenues, the government hopes to better align the incentives of providers (hospital staff) with the overall financial performance of the health facility. Contracting between VSS and a health care provider is normally done for providers who operate as a separate legal entity. In effect, these are limited to provincial, central, and district level hospitals. Commune Health Centers (CHC) and inter-commune polyclinics can provide services to insured members but they are supervised by District Health Centers (DHC) and hence they do not possess a legal entity status to operate a bank account. VSS therefore cannot contract directly with them but must coordinate commune level health service provision under the supervision of the DHCs. With regard to quality control, the VSS plays little to no role in overseeing the quality of care. They serve primarily as the bill-payer and general orchestrator of the system. There are currently no clinical guidelines enforced by the MoH or VSS, and there is no credible quality assurance mechanism. Providers are largely free to treat patients as they choose. Compulsory and Voluntary Health Insurance SchemesProvider payment mechanisms Provider Payment Mechanisms: Fee-for-service Although there has been some innovation in provider reimbursement over the past few years, fee-for-service (FFS) remains the dominant payment mechanism. Rates are set by the fee schedule, and have remained unchanged since the schedule was created in 1995. In light of concerns that FFS payments encourage providers to treat patients more than is clinically necessary, the Vietnamese government has begun exploring alternative methods of payment. Additionally, an incentive-based structure for providers has been put in place that has tied provider payment to the financial performance of the facility. The FFS rates were created by an interministerial commission consisting of representatives from MoH, the Ministry of Finance (MoF), the Ministry of Labor, War Invalids, and Social Affairs (MOLISA) and the State Price Commission (SPC). The fees in the schedule are a mixture of per-item charges and per diem rates, with ranges for each type, and variations according to the type of hospital (higher class hospitals being able to charge more). With the exception of the addition of 1,022 new procedures in 2006, fees have been unchanged since the major initiative of 1995, not even to adjust for inflation. However, the government plans to update the fee schedule to reflect current rates. Note that drugs prices are not regulated by VSS (though they are monitored), and providers have the scope, in practice, to levy unofficial charges. The New Health Insurance Law 2008 provides for several different provider payment methods, including FFS, capitation, diagnostic-related group (DRG) or other modes of payment. Innovation in provider payment remains a top priority for reforms to improve the health insurance system. Beyond fees, Vietnam has an incentive structure for providers tied to the financial performance of their facility. Under Decree 33/1995, providers had limited ability to retain a portion (30%) of gross revenues from user fees. However, under this system, opportunities for incentive payments are highly variable based on the facility and the population they serve, and this structure had high potential for creating further imbalances in the system. This incentive structure has since been replaced by Decrees 10/2002 and 43/2006, which allow hospitals greater discretion over financial operations, management of human resources, organization of services, and choices of services offered. By providing greater autonomy to facilities over the management of their costs and revenues, the government hopes to better align the incentives of providers (hospital staff) with the overall financial performance of the health facility. Contracting between VSS and a health care provider is normally done for providers who operate as a separate legal entity. In effect, these are limited to provincial, central, and district level hospitals. Commune Health Centers (CHC) and inter-commune polyclinics can provide services to insured members but they are supervised by District Health Centers (DHC) and hence they do not possess a legal entity status to operate a bank account. VSS therefore cannot contract directly with them but must coordinate commune level health service provision under the supervision of the DHCs. With regard to quality control, the VSS plays little to no role in overseeing the quality of care. They serve primarily as the bill-payer and general orchestrator of the system. There are currently no clinical guidelines enforced by the MoH or VSS, and there is no credible quality assurance mechanism. Providers are largely free to treat patients as they choose. |
| Estonia: Estonian Health Insurance Fund |
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The EHIF negotiates capped cost and volume contracts with hospitals at the start of each year. These contracts contain provisions on service quality and access, as well as an extended cost and volume section. The contracting process begins with a needs assessment based on historical data regarding health service utilization along with existing waiting times. The EHIF does not have to contract with all providers. Still most of the services are purchased from hospital master plan hospitals with which EHIF has contracts. A small amount of funds go to selective contracting which provides private providers the opportunity to get some health insurance funding. These private providers, however, tend to be primarily funded through OOP payments. A large part of the standard contract conditions are negotiated with the Hospital Association, but there are also financial appendices that are negotiated with each provider individually. Contracts are monitored quarterly using the Management Information System. Read full sectionThe EHIF negotiates capped cost and volume contracts with hospitals at the start of each year. These contracts contain provisions on service quality and access, as well as an extended cost and volume section. The contracting process begins with a needs assessment based on historical data regarding health service utilization along with existing waiting times. The EHIF does not have to contract with all providers. Still most of the services are purchased from hospital master plan hospitals with which EHIF has contracts. A small amount of funds go to selective contracting which provides private providers the opportunity to get some health insurance funding. These private providers, however, tend to be primarily funded through OOP payments. A large part of the standard contract conditions are negotiated with the Hospital Association, but there are also financial appendices that are negotiated with each provider individually. Contracts are monitored quarterly using the Management Information System.
Actual payment methods and prices are regulated in a single government health service list that lies outside of the contract negotiation process and which is updated at least once per year. All providers are paid the same prices. The list includes over 2,000 different items and a range of different payment methods. Outpatient care is normally paid on a fee-for-service basis and inpatient care is paid with a mix of fee-for-service, per diem, and diagnosis-related group (DRG) methods. Primary care family physicians are paid through per capita payments that are adjusted based on the age of the patients. If a family physician has fewer than 1,200 patients, he will still receive a capitation payment for 1,200 patients in order to cover fixed costs. Family physicians can also receive additional fee-for-service payments up to 32% of the capitation amount received. Contracts for family medicine are agreed to between the EHIF and the Estonian Association of Family Doctors. The financial stipulations of the contracts with particular family doctors are reviewed every quarter in order to align with changes in the number of patients on the practice list. Specialist care is also compensated using different types of payment methods depending on the services provided. These methods include fee-for-service, visit fees, per diem, diagnosis-related group, and case-based complex pricing. Since the 1990s, there has been a gradual move away from fee-for service toward case-based payments.
Estonian Health Insurance FundProvider payment mechanisms Provider Payment Mechanisms: Fee-for-service, Capitation, Diagnosis-Related Groups The EHIF negotiates capped cost and volume contracts with hospitals at the start of each year. These contracts contain provisions on service quality and access, as well as an extended cost and volume section. The contracting process begins with a needs assessment based on historical data regarding health service utilization along with existing waiting times. The EHIF does not have to contract with all providers. Still most of the services are purchased from hospital master plan hospitals with which EHIF has contracts. A small amount of funds go to selective contracting which provides private providers the opportunity to get some health insurance funding. These private providers, however, tend to be primarily funded through OOP payments. A large part of the standard contract conditions are negotiated with the Hospital Association, but there are also financial appendices that are negotiated with each provider individually. Contracts are monitored quarterly using the Management Information System.
Actual payment methods and prices are regulated in a single government health service list that lies outside of the contract negotiation process and which is updated at least once per year. All providers are paid the same prices. The list includes over 2,000 different items and a range of different payment methods. Outpatient care is normally paid on a fee-for-service basis and inpatient care is paid with a mix of fee-for-service, per diem, and diagnosis-related group (DRG) methods. Primary care family physicians are paid through per capita payments that are adjusted based on the age of the patients. If a family physician has fewer than 1,200 patients, he will still receive a capitation payment for 1,200 patients in order to cover fixed costs. Family physicians can also receive additional fee-for-service payments up to 32% of the capitation amount received. Contracts for family medicine are agreed to between the EHIF and the Estonian Association of Family Doctors. The financial stipulations of the contracts with particular family doctors are reviewed every quarter in order to align with changes in the number of patients on the practice list. Specialist care is also compensated using different types of payment methods depending on the services provided. These methods include fee-for-service, visit fees, per diem, diagnosis-related group, and case-based complex pricing. Since the 1990s, there has been a gradual move away from fee-for service toward case-based payments.
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| Indonesia: Jamkesmas |
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While the Jamkesmas benefit package is standardized at the national level, districts are able to set the reimbursement rates for various services based on local conditions. Though the scheme initially utilized a fee-for-service reimbursement mechanism Jamkesmas began transitioning to a DRG provider payment system in 2009. All hospitals are being incorporated into the DRG payment process by the end of 2010. Read full sectionWhile the Jamkesmas benefit package is standardized at the national level, districts are able to set the reimbursement rates for various services based on local conditions. Though the scheme initially utilized a fee-for-service reimbursement mechanism Jamkesmas began transitioning to a DRG provider payment system in 2009. All hospitals are being incorporated into the DRG payment process by the end of 2010. Jamkesmas has “verificators” in every network hospital. These verificators have been put in place to assure reimbursements are made only for documentable claims with a full medical record. Verificators process claims and send them electronically to the MoH. Verificators have standard review procedures which they follow to document every case. These standards were developed by the MoH. Once the MoH receives the claim, it begins the reimbursement process to providers. While there has been broad experience with contracting public and private providers through the publically-funded schemes, the contract mechanisms have not used reimbursement or payment policies strategically to drive improvements in quality or efficiency. There are examples in maternal health where the current reimbursement system by Jamkesmas has created the wrong incentives for providers, such as not reimbursing midwives for pre-delivery care if there is post-partum hemorrhage. In addition, once a patient is referred to the hospital, the hospital receives a full reimbursement for delivery, while the midwife receives no fee, thereby discouraging midwives from referring patients to hospitals for complications as they would lose income. JamkesmasProvider payment mechanisms Provider Payment Mechanisms: Fee-for-service, Diagnosis-Related Groups While the Jamkesmas benefit package is standardized at the national level, districts are able to set the reimbursement rates for various services based on local conditions. Though the scheme initially utilized a fee-for-service reimbursement mechanism Jamkesmas began transitioning to a DRG provider payment system in 2009. All hospitals are being incorporated into the DRG payment process by the end of 2010. Jamkesmas has “verificators” in every network hospital. These verificators have been put in place to assure reimbursements are made only for documentable claims with a full medical record. Verificators process claims and send them electronically to the MoH. Verificators have standard review procedures which they follow to document every case. These standards were developed by the MoH. Once the MoH receives the claim, it begins the reimbursement process to providers. While there has been broad experience with contracting public and private providers through the publically-funded schemes, the contract mechanisms have not used reimbursement or payment policies strategically to drive improvements in quality or efficiency. There are examples in maternal health where the current reimbursement system by Jamkesmas has created the wrong incentives for providers, such as not reimbursing midwives for pre-delivery care if there is post-partum hemorrhage. In addition, once a patient is referred to the hospital, the hospital receives a full reimbursement for delivery, while the midwife receives no fee, thereby discouraging midwives from referring patients to hospitals for complications as they would lose income. |
| Kyrgyz Republic: Mandatory Health Insurance Fund (MHIF) |
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Outpatient care is funded through capitation-based payments while hospital services are funded through case-based payments. The capitation formula for primary care is adjusted by coefficients for rural, small towns, and mountainous areas. This leads to cross-subsidization across geographical boundaries. Read full sectionOutpatient care is funded through capitation-based payments while hospital services are funded through case-based payments. The capitation formula for primary care is adjusted by coefficients for rural, small towns, and mountainous areas. This leads to cross-subsidization across geographical boundaries. The base primary care capitation rate (before adjustment coefficients) is based on two variables, the estimated number of enrollees that are expected to be enrolled in a family group practice over the coming year, and the size of the budget. The case-based payments for hospital services introduced the idea of output-based payments to the Kyrgyz health system. The system for grouping cases, generally called clinical statistical groups, was based on American diagnosis-related-groups, but was created with Kyrgyz utilization and cost data. This new system enabled an expansion of the budget management autonomy of hospital administrators, although hospital autonomy and management capacity is still an issue on the reform agenda. The republican MHIF and its territorial branches administer the national pool of funds for the SGBP and are responsible for making all case- and capitation-based payments. Per-case payment rates are defined prospectively but payments are made on a monthly basis. In order to avoid provider selection, providers receive higher payments for treating exempt patients and those with lower copayments. A key to the success of the MHIF as the single-payer for the SGBP has been the continuous development and refinement of financial and clinical information systems to operate the provider payment systems and ensure good financial reporting and fiduciary risk mitigation. Mandatory Health Insurance Fund (MHIF)Provider payment mechanisms Provider Payment Mechanisms: Capitation, Diagnosis-Related Groups Outpatient care is funded through capitation-based payments while hospital services are funded through case-based payments. The capitation formula for primary care is adjusted by coefficients for rural, small towns, and mountainous areas. This leads to cross-subsidization across geographical boundaries. The base primary care capitation rate (before adjustment coefficients) is based on two variables, the estimated number of enrollees that are expected to be enrolled in a family group practice over the coming year, and the size of the budget. The case-based payments for hospital services introduced the idea of output-based payments to the Kyrgyz health system. The system for grouping cases, generally called clinical statistical groups, was based on American diagnosis-related-groups, but was created with Kyrgyz utilization and cost data. This new system enabled an expansion of the budget management autonomy of hospital administrators, although hospital autonomy and management capacity is still an issue on the reform agenda. The republican MHIF and its territorial branches administer the national pool of funds for the SGBP and are responsible for making all case- and capitation-based payments. Per-case payment rates are defined prospectively but payments are made on a monthly basis. In order to avoid provider selection, providers receive higher payments for treating exempt patients and those with lower copayments. A key to the success of the MHIF as the single-payer for the SGBP has been the continuous development and refinement of financial and clinical information systems to operate the provider payment systems and ensure good financial reporting and fiduciary risk mitigation. |
| Rwanda: Mutuelles de Sante |
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The health insurance system in Rwanda has two main channels for financing: the demand side – the insurance programs, and the supply side – transfers from the treasury to districts and health facilities. On the demand side, services are financed through three main channels: demand-based user payments, demand-based payments from Mutuelles, and demand-based payments from RAMA and MMI. Read full sectionThe health insurance system in Rwanda has two main channels for financing: the demand side – the insurance programs, and the supply side – transfers from the treasury to districts and health facilities. On the demand side, services are financed through three main channels: demand-based user payments, demand-based payments from Mutuelles, and demand-based payments from RAMA and MMI.
On the supply side, financing flows from the central government towards health providers through multiple block grants, which provide hospitals with greater degrees of autonomy. A key issue on the supply-side financing is the equity of the needs based transfers against the historical criteria. The government hopes to progressively move towards increasing the importance of needs-based transfers and decreasing historical transfers.
A key issue on the supply-side financing is the equity of the needs based transfers against the historical criteria. The government hopes to progressively move towards increasing the importance of needs-based transfers and decreasing historical transfers. In addition, the substantial amount of donor funding incurs high overhead costs and involves a lack of clarity. Mutuelles de SanteProvider payment mechanisms Provider Payment Mechanisms: Fee-for-service, Capitation The health insurance system in Rwanda has two main channels for financing: the demand side – the insurance programs, and the supply side – transfers from the treasury to districts and health facilities. On the demand side, services are financed through three main channels: demand-based user payments, demand-based payments from Mutuelles, and demand-based payments from RAMA and MMI.
On the supply side, financing flows from the central government towards health providers through multiple block grants, which provide hospitals with greater degrees of autonomy. A key issue on the supply-side financing is the equity of the needs based transfers against the historical criteria. The government hopes to progressively move towards increasing the importance of needs-based transfers and decreasing historical transfers.
A key issue on the supply-side financing is the equity of the needs based transfers against the historical criteria. The government hopes to progressively move towards increasing the importance of needs-based transfers and decreasing historical transfers. In addition, the substantial amount of donor funding incurs high overhead costs and involves a lack of clarity. |
| Chile: National Health Fund (FONASA) |
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FONASA transfers money to public health care providers through fee-for-service mechanisms for certain services and groups of services that are assigned a fixed value. The remainder of resources for health care services and facility maintenance in the public sector is transferred based on historical budgets, which tend to be antiquated and therefore undervalued. In terms of transfer mechanisms, FONASA funds are not transferred directly to the individual health care providers. Read full sectionFONASA transfers money to public health care providers through fee-for-service mechanisms for certain services and groups of services that are assigned a fixed value. The remainder of resources for health care services and facility maintenance in the public sector is transferred based on historical budgets, which tend to be antiquated and therefore undervalued. In terms of transfer mechanisms, FONASA funds are not transferred directly to the individual health care providers. Rather, funds are transferred to the regional health entity (under the purview of the MOH) for the geographical region where the provider is located. The regional health entity pools the funds for all public health care providers in the area and then is charged with determining the budget of each provider. FONASA also transfers funds prospectively to the regional health entities for primary care facilities through capitation mechanisms. These funds are based on a region’s health care needs and its disease burden. FONASA and the ISAPREs transfer funds to private providers on a retrospective fee-for-service basis. Private providers always receive funds through fee-for-service mechanisms, and they have no ceiling on income, regardless of whether the source of the funds is FONASA or an ISAPRE. National Health Fund (FONASA)Provider payment mechanisms Provider Payment Mechanisms: Fee-for-service, Capitation FONASA transfers money to public health care providers through fee-for-service mechanisms for certain services and groups of services that are assigned a fixed value. The remainder of resources for health care services and facility maintenance in the public sector is transferred based on historical budgets, which tend to be antiquated and therefore undervalued. In terms of transfer mechanisms, FONASA funds are not transferred directly to the individual health care providers. Rather, funds are transferred to the regional health entity (under the purview of the MOH) for the geographical region where the provider is located. The regional health entity pools the funds for all public health care providers in the area and then is charged with determining the budget of each provider. FONASA also transfers funds prospectively to the regional health entities for primary care facilities through capitation mechanisms. These funds are based on a region’s health care needs and its disease burden. FONASA and the ISAPREs transfer funds to private providers on a retrospective fee-for-service basis. Private providers always receive funds through fee-for-service mechanisms, and they have no ceiling on income, regardless of whether the source of the funds is FONASA or an ISAPRE. |
| Mexico: Seguro Popular |
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The interventions included in the CAUSES are paid for by capitation. Meanwhile, the interventions carried out under the FPGC are paid for on a per-case basis. The payment mechanism for contracts with private providers is vague. The reform stated that health services should be provided by state health secretariats in accordance with the state of residence of the insured family or by other public health institutions that have contracted with the state health secretariats. After the passage of the law, however, the executive branch issued a by-law that introduced the option of contracting with the private sector. The problem with this by-law is that it does not specify the form that payments to private sector will take. Thus, such payments take place on an ad-hoc, non-systematic basis. Read full sectionThe interventions included in the CAUSES are paid for by capitation. Meanwhile, the interventions carried out under the FPGC are paid for on a per-case basis. The payment mechanism for contracts with private providers is vague. The reform stated that health services should be provided by state health secretariats in accordance with the state of residence of the insured family or by other public health institutions that have contracted with the state health secretariats. After the passage of the law, however, the executive branch issued a by-law that introduced the option of contracting with the private sector. The problem with this by-law is that it does not specify the form that payments to private sector will take. Thus, such payments take place on an ad-hoc, non-systematic basis. Seguro PopularProvider payment mechanisms Provider Payment Mechanisms: Fee-for-service, Capitation, Diagnosis-Related Groups The interventions included in the CAUSES are paid for by capitation. Meanwhile, the interventions carried out under the FPGC are paid for on a per-case basis. The payment mechanism for contracts with private providers is vague. The reform stated that health services should be provided by state health secretariats in accordance with the state of residence of the insured family or by other public health institutions that have contracted with the state health secretariats. After the passage of the law, however, the executive branch issued a by-law that introduced the option of contracting with the private sector. The problem with this by-law is that it does not specify the form that payments to private sector will take. Thus, such payments take place on an ad-hoc, non-systematic basis. |
| Brazil: Unified Health System (SUS) |
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Primary care providers at the municipal level are paid on a per capita basis. Transfers from state and federal resources trickle down to the municipal level through streams such as the basic health program (PAB), the PSF, and the PACS. Read full sectionPrimary care providers at the municipal level are paid on a per capita basis. Transfers from state and federal resources trickle down to the municipal level through streams such as the basic health program (PAB), the PSF, and the PACS. The same method of provider payments is used for both private and public providers under the SUS. Payments for hospital stays and complex procedures are based on Hospital Stay Authorization (AIH) codes. The AIH payment system is a procedure- or service-based rate system that is not linked to resource usage or costs. Fixed values are established per disease and necessary procedures. Hospitals that undertake complex procedures receive additional resources to maintain their facilities. Ambulatory services are paid by the health funds based on Ambulatory Care Units (UCA) plus an additional fixed amount for each service rendered.
Unified Health System (SUS)Provider payment mechanisms Provider Payment Mechanisms: Capitation, Diagnosis-Related Groups Primary care providers at the municipal level are paid on a per capita basis. Transfers from state and federal resources trickle down to the municipal level through streams such as the basic health program (PAB), the PSF, and the PACS. The same method of provider payments is used for both private and public providers under the SUS. Payments for hospital stays and complex procedures are based on Hospital Stay Authorization (AIH) codes. The AIH payment system is a procedure- or service-based rate system that is not linked to resource usage or costs. Fixed values are established per disease and necessary procedures. Hospitals that undertake complex procedures receive additional resources to maintain their facilities. Ambulatory services are paid by the health funds based on Ambulatory Care Units (UCA) plus an additional fixed amount for each service rendered.
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| Thailand: Universal Coverage Scheme |
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UCS uses capitation as the main provider payment mechanism. Initially, providers were given the option of receiving reimbursements based on either total capitation or capitation for outpatient services and DRG for inpatient services at the provincial level. However, due to the disincentive of paying providers for high-cost care and delays in case referrals, UCS began using a single payment system in 2003. Read full sectionUCS uses capitation as the main provider payment mechanism. Initially, providers were given the option of receiving reimbursements based on either total capitation or capitation for outpatient services and DRG for inpatient services at the provincial level. However, due to the disincentive of paying providers for high-cost care and delays in case referrals, UCS began using a single payment system in 2003. The current payment mechanism for UCS is a mixed system of risk-adjusted capitation for primary care, a DRG-based capped global budget, and fixed rate fees for some services. It should be noted that health promotion and prevention services for all Thai citizens are paid by the UCS. Universal Coverage SchemeProvider payment mechanisms Provider Payment Mechanisms: Capitation UCS uses capitation as the main provider payment mechanism. Initially, providers were given the option of receiving reimbursements based on either total capitation or capitation for outpatient services and DRG for inpatient services at the provincial level. However, due to the disincentive of paying providers for high-cost care and delays in case referrals, UCS began using a single payment system in 2003. The current payment mechanism for UCS is a mixed system of risk-adjusted capitation for primary care, a DRG-based capped global budget, and fixed rate fees for some services. It should be noted that health promotion and prevention services for all Thai citizens are paid by the UCS. |
