The Joint Learning Network for Universal Health Coverage systematically documents the reforms of its member countries and other countries that have expanded health coverage through demand-side financing. The case studies contained in these pages are brief, comparative and modular in nature, describing the key highlights and technical features of each program.
Compare various dimensions of country reform efforts using our interactive tool.
| Program | Provider Payment Mechanisms | Provider payment mechanisms |
|---|---|---|
| Colombia: General System of Social Security in Health |
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EPSs and EPSSs are free to establish payment levels and payment mechanisms for services that they purchase from providers. Both entities have used the fee schedules, adjusted for inflation, developed by the pre-reform public health plans as ceilings for price negotiations. As of 2008, provider associations were forcefully seeking the establishment of price floors by the MPS. Read full sectionEPSs and EPSSs are free to establish payment levels and payment mechanisms for services that they purchase from providers. Both entities have used the fee schedules, adjusted for inflation, developed by the pre-reform public health plans as ceilings for price negotiations. As of 2008, provider associations were forcefully seeking the establishment of price floors by the MPS. There are two payment mechanisms common to both EPSs and EPSSs. In general, preventive and primary care services are contracted on a capitation basis. Most specialist and hospital care, however, is paid for either on a fee-for-service basis or by a services package. The CR and SR enrollees must also pay copayments, which vary according to an individual’s income. CR copayments are charged according to salary income. Enrollees with salaries lower than 2 minimum monthly salaries (mms) have a maximum copayment of USD46.70 annually. The maximum copayment for enrollees with incomes in the range of 2-5 mms is USD 195.20 annually. Finally, enrollees with incomes greater than 5 mms have a maximum copayment of USD390.30 annually. SR copayments are set according to SISBEN category. The poorest enrollees, who are classified in category 1, pay co copayments. On the opposite end of the scale, enrollees classified in category 3 pay 10% of the service value. General System of Social Security in HealthProvider payment mechanisms Provider Payment Mechanisms: Fee-for-service, Capitation EPSs and EPSSs are free to establish payment levels and payment mechanisms for services that they purchase from providers. Both entities have used the fee schedules, adjusted for inflation, developed by the pre-reform public health plans as ceilings for price negotiations. As of 2008, provider associations were forcefully seeking the establishment of price floors by the MPS. There are two payment mechanisms common to both EPSs and EPSSs. In general, preventive and primary care services are contracted on a capitation basis. Most specialist and hospital care, however, is paid for either on a fee-for-service basis or by a services package. The CR and SR enrollees must also pay copayments, which vary according to an individual’s income. CR copayments are charged according to salary income. Enrollees with salaries lower than 2 minimum monthly salaries (mms) have a maximum copayment of USD46.70 annually. The maximum copayment for enrollees with incomes in the range of 2-5 mms is USD 195.20 annually. Finally, enrollees with incomes greater than 5 mms have a maximum copayment of USD390.30 annually. SR copayments are set according to SISBEN category. The poorest enrollees, who are classified in category 1, pay co copayments. On the opposite end of the scale, enrollees classified in category 3 pay 10% of the service value. |
| Rwanda: Mutuelles de Sante |
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The health insurance system in Rwanda has two main channels for financing: the demand side – the insurance programs, and the supply side – transfers from the treasury to districts and health facilities. On the demand side, services are financed through three main channels: demand-based user payments, demand-based payments from Mutuelles, and demand-based payments from RAMA and MMI. Read full sectionThe health insurance system in Rwanda has two main channels for financing: the demand side – the insurance programs, and the supply side – transfers from the treasury to districts and health facilities. On the demand side, services are financed through three main channels: demand-based user payments, demand-based payments from Mutuelles, and demand-based payments from RAMA and MMI.
On the supply side, financing flows from the central government towards health providers through multiple block grants, which provide hospitals with greater degrees of autonomy. A key issue on the supply-side financing is the equity of the needs based transfers against the historical criteria. The government hopes to progressively move towards increasing the importance of needs-based transfers and decreasing historical transfers.
A key issue on the supply-side financing is the equity of the needs based transfers against the historical criteria. The government hopes to progressively move towards increasing the importance of needs-based transfers and decreasing historical transfers. In addition, the substantial amount of donor funding incurs high overhead costs and involves a lack of clarity. Mutuelles de SanteProvider payment mechanisms Provider Payment Mechanisms: Fee-for-service, Capitation The health insurance system in Rwanda has two main channels for financing: the demand side – the insurance programs, and the supply side – transfers from the treasury to districts and health facilities. On the demand side, services are financed through three main channels: demand-based user payments, demand-based payments from Mutuelles, and demand-based payments from RAMA and MMI.
On the supply side, financing flows from the central government towards health providers through multiple block grants, which provide hospitals with greater degrees of autonomy. A key issue on the supply-side financing is the equity of the needs based transfers against the historical criteria. The government hopes to progressively move towards increasing the importance of needs-based transfers and decreasing historical transfers.
A key issue on the supply-side financing is the equity of the needs based transfers against the historical criteria. The government hopes to progressively move towards increasing the importance of needs-based transfers and decreasing historical transfers. In addition, the substantial amount of donor funding incurs high overhead costs and involves a lack of clarity. |
| Ghana: National Health Insurance Scheme (NHIS) |
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In 2004, a memorandum of understanding regarding the services covered and prices charged was signed by the NHIC and service provider representatives. Claims are filed by the health facilities and the district schemes pay providers on a DRG basis. Typically, a reimbursement check comes 6 months after a claim is submitted. Read full sectionIn 2004, a memorandum of understanding regarding the services covered and prices charged was signed by the NHIC and service provider representatives. Claims are filed by the health facilities and the district schemes pay providers on a DRG basis. Typically, a reimbursement check comes 6 months after a claim is submitted. This memorandum now forms the basis of all contracts between the health schemes and providers. Claims processing is a manual process, with some automation in enrollment verifications and claims documentation. The amount of the reimbursement is often less than 100%, with some schemes, for example, paying 70% (e.g., Ossu Kottery – urban scheme in higher income area of Accra), others paying as low as 40% (e.g., Dodowah, rural area outside Accra). The balance is supposed to be paid at later date. National Health Insurance Scheme (NHIS)Provider payment mechanisms Provider Payment Mechanisms: Diagnosis-Related Groups In 2004, a memorandum of understanding regarding the services covered and prices charged was signed by the NHIC and service provider representatives. Claims are filed by the health facilities and the district schemes pay providers on a DRG basis. Typically, a reimbursement check comes 6 months after a claim is submitted. This memorandum now forms the basis of all contracts between the health schemes and providers. Claims processing is a manual process, with some automation in enrollment verifications and claims documentation. The amount of the reimbursement is often less than 100%, with some schemes, for example, paying 70% (e.g., Ossu Kottery – urban scheme in higher income area of Accra), others paying as low as 40% (e.g., Dodowah, rural area outside Accra). The balance is supposed to be paid at later date. |
| Nigeria: National Health Insurance System |
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Patients are allowed to choose their primary provider from the list of accredited facilities, which includes both public and private providers. The provider network is used for access and secondary referrals, which acts to control costs and maintain viability of the system. Provider payment mechanisms are primarily determined by the National Health Insurance System (NHIS) Governing Council. Read full sectionPatients are allowed to choose their primary provider from the list of accredited facilities, which includes both public and private providers. The provider network is used for access and secondary referrals, which acts to control costs and maintain viability of the system. Provider payment mechanisms are primarily determined by the National Health Insurance System (NHIS) Governing Council. For private insurers, this is determined between HMOs and Providers, with oversight from the central government, and referral to specialist care follows guidelines that are managed accordingly. Decree 35 determined that the only lawful payment systems to be included in NHIS are capitation, fee-for-service, per diem, or case payment. A capitation system is the predominant form of provider payment used to pay primary healthcare facilities, while secondary and tertiary healthcare facilities are paid by fee for service and per diem. National Health Insurance SystemProvider payment mechanisms Provider Payment Mechanisms: Fee-for-service, Capitation Patients are allowed to choose their primary provider from the list of accredited facilities, which includes both public and private providers. The provider network is used for access and secondary referrals, which acts to control costs and maintain viability of the system. Provider payment mechanisms are primarily determined by the National Health Insurance System (NHIS) Governing Council. For private insurers, this is determined between HMOs and Providers, with oversight from the central government, and referral to specialist care follows guidelines that are managed accordingly. Decree 35 determined that the only lawful payment systems to be included in NHIS are capitation, fee-for-service, per diem, or case payment. A capitation system is the predominant form of provider payment used to pay primary healthcare facilities, while secondary and tertiary healthcare facilities are paid by fee for service and per diem. |
| Kenya: National Hospital Insurance Fund |
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The National Hospital Insurance Fund (NHIF) and private insurers have negotiated fixed reimbursement rates for in-patient care. The reimbursement amount varies slightly with the level of provider, the diagnosis, and the type of care required. “Contract A” and “Contract B” providers are typically reimbursed through case based or fee-for-service provider payments. “Contract C” providers are reimbursed through a per diem rebate system. Claims are submitted by hospitals directly to the National Hospital Insurance Fund (NHIF), and then hospitals are paid for procedures and users are reimbursed. Most claims are reimbursed within 14 days of the claim received. This process is computerized and is designed to be transparent to the providers. Read full sectionThe National Hospital Insurance Fund (NHIF) and private insurers have negotiated fixed reimbursement rates for in-patient care. The reimbursement amount varies slightly with the level of provider, the diagnosis, and the type of care required. “Contract A” and “Contract B” providers are typically reimbursed through case based or fee-for-service provider payments. “Contract C” providers are reimbursed through a per diem rebate system. Claims are submitted by hospitals directly to the National Hospital Insurance Fund (NHIF), and then hospitals are paid for procedures and users are reimbursed. Most claims are reimbursed within 14 days of the claim received. This process is computerized and is designed to be transparent to the providers. Moving forward, the NHIF intends to increasingly employ case-based payments for inpatient services. As the NHIF adds outpatient care to the benefits package with implementation of the recently gazette changes, capitation to comprehensive-care facilities will be the intended payment mechanisms. The fee-for-service system has been identified as one of the key drivers of escalating health care costs, as it creates incentives to encourage over-servicing and supplier-induced demand. The majority of services covered by the NHIF are delivered through private facilities, indicating a preference by the bulk of salaried workers (who make up the majority of those covered by NHIF) toward private providers rather than public institutions. Of overall health expenditures in Kenya, Secondary and Tertiary care providers traditionally absorb approximately 70% of health expenditures, though health centers and primary care units provide the bulk of services. Health personnel expenditures are high—accounting for about 50% of the budget—compared to expenditures on drugs, pharmaceuticals, and operations and maintenance. Expenditures for curative care constitute more than 48% of the total MOH budget. Health care facilities also receive payments from the Ministry of Health (MOH), which releases funds to the district and national level hospitals. Allocations to the district health centers and dispensaries are in the form of line-item budgets, whereas national level hospitals receive global budgets. Salaries to staff are paid directly by the MOH. Drugs are also procured centrally, by the Kenya Medical Suppliers Agency (KEMSA) and then delivered to district and local level facilities. At the local level, the process of disbursement of funds is slow, which causes uncertainty for the providers, impedes their planning process, and encourages district level managers to await funding before they procure services, and creates an incentive to under-service clients. National Hospital Insurance FundProvider payment mechanisms Provider Payment Mechanisms: Fee-for-service, Diagnosis-Related Groups, Other The National Hospital Insurance Fund (NHIF) and private insurers have negotiated fixed reimbursement rates for in-patient care. The reimbursement amount varies slightly with the level of provider, the diagnosis, and the type of care required. “Contract A” and “Contract B” providers are typically reimbursed through case based or fee-for-service provider payments. “Contract C” providers are reimbursed through a per diem rebate system. Claims are submitted by hospitals directly to the National Hospital Insurance Fund (NHIF), and then hospitals are paid for procedures and users are reimbursed. Most claims are reimbursed within 14 days of the claim received. This process is computerized and is designed to be transparent to the providers. Moving forward, the NHIF intends to increasingly employ case-based payments for inpatient services. As the NHIF adds outpatient care to the benefits package with implementation of the recently gazette changes, capitation to comprehensive-care facilities will be the intended payment mechanisms. The fee-for-service system has been identified as one of the key drivers of escalating health care costs, as it creates incentives to encourage over-servicing and supplier-induced demand. The majority of services covered by the NHIF are delivered through private facilities, indicating a preference by the bulk of salaried workers (who make up the majority of those covered by NHIF) toward private providers rather than public institutions. Of overall health expenditures in Kenya, Secondary and Tertiary care providers traditionally absorb approximately 70% of health expenditures, though health centers and primary care units provide the bulk of services. Health personnel expenditures are high—accounting for about 50% of the budget—compared to expenditures on drugs, pharmaceuticals, and operations and maintenance. Expenditures for curative care constitute more than 48% of the total MOH budget. Health care facilities also receive payments from the Ministry of Health (MOH), which releases funds to the district and national level hospitals. Allocations to the district health centers and dispensaries are in the form of line-item budgets, whereas national level hospitals receive global budgets. Salaries to staff are paid directly by the MOH. Drugs are also procured centrally, by the Kenya Medical Suppliers Agency (KEMSA) and then delivered to district and local level facilities. At the local level, the process of disbursement of funds is slow, which causes uncertainty for the providers, impedes their planning process, and encourages district level managers to await funding before they procure services, and creates an incentive to under-service clients. |
| Philippines: PhilHealth |
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Provider payment methods differ based on the type of care delivered. Fee-for-service reimbursements are used for inpatient care, most day surgeries, and ambulatory procedures, while primary care providers are reimbursed based on a capitation system. Read full sectionProvider payment methods differ based on the type of care delivered. Fee-for-service reimbursements are used for inpatient care, most day surgeries, and ambulatory procedures, while primary care providers are reimbursed based on a capitation system. For TB-DOTS treatment, malaria care, deliveries, surgical contraception, and cataract surgeries, a case-based payment methodology is utilized. There is no formal system that sets fixed deductibles or co-payments for beneficiaries, but health care providers are allowed to “balance bill”, charging patients the balance between what PhilHealth pays and the total cost of care. This is atypical of most government health programs around the world and can lead to abuse by providers (e.g., overcharging) and thus limited access for the poorest. At the same time, balance billing allows providers additional cost recovery in the case that the reimbursement for services does not cover their cost. Quality: PhilHealth currently leverages internally developed quality standards. A new set of standards called the “PhilHealth Benchbook” was implemented starting January 1, 2010. The Benchbook was developed by PhilHealth with the assistance of various international health partners and several rounds of consultations with health providers. The previous and new quality standards are overseen by PhilHealth. The new quality standards focus on the following domains of quality of care: patient rights and organizational ethic, patient care, leadership and management, human resource management, information management, safe practice and environment, and mechanisms of improving performance. With the implementation of the new standards this year, hospitals can now be accredited for up to 3 years compared with the previous practice of annual accreditation. PhilHealth has accreditation staff who physically check and verify compliance. PhilHealth has also set peer review committees essentially composed of health care providers who review specific cases. PhilHealth has been planning to implement quality-based purchasing but has not executed on this plan as of December 2009. Performance-based Payment: PhilHealth has been developing incentive payments but this work has been focused on payment to health care professionals and not for health facilities. Doctors are usually independent free agents who ‘practice’ in hospitals. Even government physicians who are salaried are allowed to engage in private practice. Thus, PhilHealth payments are split for health professionals and health facilities and efforts to implement case payments essentially focus on bundling the payment for the health facilities. Among PhilHealth’s work in incentive-based payments is a scheme that has been piloted in 30 local government hospitals since 2002 but has not been scaled up. The scheme is called the Quality Improvement Demonstration Study (QIDS). It utilizes clinical vignettes to measure quality of care. If a hospital passes a set quality of care index score, the payment for physicians is increased. Clinical vignettes focus on the management of illnesses of children less than six years of age. Another incentive scheme is increased payment for health professionals practicing in areas where there is a lack of doctors. Claims Processing: The claims processing procedure is still a manual operation. Electronic claims submissions have long been planned but have not been implemented. Hospitals or members fill out claims forms that are then submitted to PhilHealth within 90 days from hospital or health facility discharge. Two forms are usually submitted: First, a form that documents who the member is and premiums paid; and second, a form that details the service provided. Claims are submitted to 17 regional claims processing centers. These centers initially review if the claims are eligible. Review is inputted manually with a number of data encoded into the claims processing information system. Once the claim is approved for payment, checks are prepared for the signature of regional heads. Electronic reimbursements have been planned but have not yet been implemented. PhilHealthProvider payment mechanisms Provider Payment Mechanisms: Fee-for-service, Capitation Provider payment methods differ based on the type of care delivered. Fee-for-service reimbursements are used for inpatient care, most day surgeries, and ambulatory procedures, while primary care providers are reimbursed based on a capitation system. For TB-DOTS treatment, malaria care, deliveries, surgical contraception, and cataract surgeries, a case-based payment methodology is utilized. There is no formal system that sets fixed deductibles or co-payments for beneficiaries, but health care providers are allowed to “balance bill”, charging patients the balance between what PhilHealth pays and the total cost of care. This is atypical of most government health programs around the world and can lead to abuse by providers (e.g., overcharging) and thus limited access for the poorest. At the same time, balance billing allows providers additional cost recovery in the case that the reimbursement for services does not cover their cost. Quality: PhilHealth currently leverages internally developed quality standards. A new set of standards called the “PhilHealth Benchbook” was implemented starting January 1, 2010. The Benchbook was developed by PhilHealth with the assistance of various international health partners and several rounds of consultations with health providers. The previous and new quality standards are overseen by PhilHealth. The new quality standards focus on the following domains of quality of care: patient rights and organizational ethic, patient care, leadership and management, human resource management, information management, safe practice and environment, and mechanisms of improving performance. With the implementation of the new standards this year, hospitals can now be accredited for up to 3 years compared with the previous practice of annual accreditation. PhilHealth has accreditation staff who physically check and verify compliance. PhilHealth has also set peer review committees essentially composed of health care providers who review specific cases. PhilHealth has been planning to implement quality-based purchasing but has not executed on this plan as of December 2009. Performance-based Payment: PhilHealth has been developing incentive payments but this work has been focused on payment to health care professionals and not for health facilities. Doctors are usually independent free agents who ‘practice’ in hospitals. Even government physicians who are salaried are allowed to engage in private practice. Thus, PhilHealth payments are split for health professionals and health facilities and efforts to implement case payments essentially focus on bundling the payment for the health facilities. Among PhilHealth’s work in incentive-based payments is a scheme that has been piloted in 30 local government hospitals since 2002 but has not been scaled up. The scheme is called the Quality Improvement Demonstration Study (QIDS). It utilizes clinical vignettes to measure quality of care. If a hospital passes a set quality of care index score, the payment for physicians is increased. Clinical vignettes focus on the management of illnesses of children less than six years of age. Another incentive scheme is increased payment for health professionals practicing in areas where there is a lack of doctors. Claims Processing: The claims processing procedure is still a manual operation. Electronic claims submissions have long been planned but have not been implemented. Hospitals or members fill out claims forms that are then submitted to PhilHealth within 90 days from hospital or health facility discharge. Two forms are usually submitted: First, a form that documents who the member is and premiums paid; and second, a form that details the service provided. Claims are submitted to 17 regional claims processing centers. These centers initially review if the claims are eligible. Review is inputted manually with a number of data encoded into the claims processing information system. Once the claim is approved for payment, checks are prepared for the signature of regional heads. Electronic reimbursements have been planned but have not yet been implemented. |
| India: Rajiv Aarogyasri |
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Providers are paid on a by-intervention basis, where a specified rate is set by Aarogyasri Trust in consultation with medical experts. For each approved procedure, the payment covers the entire cost of treatment, from the date of admission to discharge, as well as a maximum of 10 days after the discharge and any complications while in the hospital. The package rate includes consultation, medicine, diagnostics, implants, food, cost of transportation, hospital charges, and post-operative hospital stay. Read full sectionProviders are paid on a by-intervention basis, where a specified rate is set by Aarogyasri Trust in consultation with medical experts. For each approved procedure, the payment covers the entire cost of treatment, from the date of admission to discharge, as well as a maximum of 10 days after the discharge and any complications while in the hospital. The package rate includes consultation, medicine, diagnostics, implants, food, cost of transportation, hospital charges, and post-operative hospital stay. A comprehensive list of benefits and associated payment pricing can be found on the Aarogyasri web site. Seeking care is truly cashless for the patient. On the back-end, the provider must submit a pre-authorization to the insurance company (Aarogyasri I procedures) or to Aarogyasri Healthcare Trust (for Aarogyasri II procedures). The insurance company/Trust appoints medical officers who work on pre-authorizations. After pre-authorization and treatment, the insurance company or Trust (depending on which Procedure the beneficiary was enrolled in) will settle claims from hospitals within seven days of receipt of claim, discharge summary, and a satisfaction letter from the patient. To prevent fraudulent claims, the claim settlement history of each hospital is scrutinized and reviewed by the Trust at regular intervals. In addition, the insurance company recruits specialized doctors, known as vigilance officers, for regular inspection of hospitals. These specialists also attend to complaints from beneficiaries directly or through Arogya Mithras for any deficiency in services reported. The specialists also to ensure proper care and counseling for the patient at network hospitals by coordinating with Aarogya Mithras and hospital authorities. Rajiv AarogyasriProvider payment mechanisms Provider Payment Mechanisms: Fee-for-service, Diagnosis-Related Groups Providers are paid on a by-intervention basis, where a specified rate is set by Aarogyasri Trust in consultation with medical experts. For each approved procedure, the payment covers the entire cost of treatment, from the date of admission to discharge, as well as a maximum of 10 days after the discharge and any complications while in the hospital. The package rate includes consultation, medicine, diagnostics, implants, food, cost of transportation, hospital charges, and post-operative hospital stay. A comprehensive list of benefits and associated payment pricing can be found on the Aarogyasri web site. Seeking care is truly cashless for the patient. On the back-end, the provider must submit a pre-authorization to the insurance company (Aarogyasri I procedures) or to Aarogyasri Healthcare Trust (for Aarogyasri II procedures). The insurance company/Trust appoints medical officers who work on pre-authorizations. After pre-authorization and treatment, the insurance company or Trust (depending on which Procedure the beneficiary was enrolled in) will settle claims from hospitals within seven days of receipt of claim, discharge summary, and a satisfaction letter from the patient. To prevent fraudulent claims, the claim settlement history of each hospital is scrutinized and reviewed by the Trust at regular intervals. In addition, the insurance company recruits specialized doctors, known as vigilance officers, for regular inspection of hospitals. These specialists also attend to complaints from beneficiaries directly or through Arogya Mithras for any deficiency in services reported. The specialists also to ensure proper care and counseling for the patient at network hospitals by coordinating with Aarogya Mithras and hospital authorities. |
| Mexico: Seguro Popular |
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The interventions included in the CAUSES are paid for by capitation. Meanwhile, the interventions carried out under the FPGC are paid for on a per-case basis. The payment mechanism for contracts with private providers is vague. The reform stated that health services should be provided by state health secretariats in accordance with the state of residence of the insured family or by other public health institutions that have contracted with the state health secretariats. After the passage of the law, however, the executive branch issued a by-law that introduced the option of contracting with the private sector. The problem with this by-law is that it does not specify the form that payments to private sector will take. Thus, such payments take place on an ad-hoc, non-systematic basis. Read full sectionThe interventions included in the CAUSES are paid for by capitation. Meanwhile, the interventions carried out under the FPGC are paid for on a per-case basis. The payment mechanism for contracts with private providers is vague. The reform stated that health services should be provided by state health secretariats in accordance with the state of residence of the insured family or by other public health institutions that have contracted with the state health secretariats. After the passage of the law, however, the executive branch issued a by-law that introduced the option of contracting with the private sector. The problem with this by-law is that it does not specify the form that payments to private sector will take. Thus, such payments take place on an ad-hoc, non-systematic basis. Seguro PopularProvider payment mechanisms Provider Payment Mechanisms: Fee-for-service, Capitation, Diagnosis-Related Groups The interventions included in the CAUSES are paid for by capitation. Meanwhile, the interventions carried out under the FPGC are paid for on a per-case basis. The payment mechanism for contracts with private providers is vague. The reform stated that health services should be provided by state health secretariats in accordance with the state of residence of the insured family or by other public health institutions that have contracted with the state health secretariats. After the passage of the law, however, the executive branch issued a by-law that introduced the option of contracting with the private sector. The problem with this by-law is that it does not specify the form that payments to private sector will take. Thus, such payments take place on an ad-hoc, non-systematic basis. |