The Joint Learning Network for Universal Health Coverage systematically documents the reforms of its member countries and other countries that have expanded health coverage through demand-side financing. The case studies contained in these pages are brief, comparative and modular in nature, describing the key highlights and technical features of each program.
Compare various dimensions of country reform efforts using our interactive tool.
| Program | Provider Payment Mechanisms | Provider payment mechanisms |
|---|---|---|
| Colombia: General System of Social Security in Health |
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EPSs and EPSSs are free to establish payment levels and payment mechanisms for services that they purchase from providers. Both entities have used the fee schedules, adjusted for inflation, developed by the pre-reform public health plans as ceilings for price negotiations. As of 2008, provider associations were forcefully seeking the establishment of price floors by the MPS. Read full sectionEPSs and EPSSs are free to establish payment levels and payment mechanisms for services that they purchase from providers. Both entities have used the fee schedules, adjusted for inflation, developed by the pre-reform public health plans as ceilings for price negotiations. As of 2008, provider associations were forcefully seeking the establishment of price floors by the MPS. There are two payment mechanisms common to both EPSs and EPSSs. In general, preventive and primary care services are contracted on a capitation basis. Most specialist and hospital care, however, is paid for either on a fee-for-service basis or by a services package. The CR and SR enrollees must also pay copayments, which vary according to an individual’s income. CR copayments are charged according to salary income. Enrollees with salaries lower than 2 minimum monthly salaries (mms) have a maximum copayment of USD46.70 annually. The maximum copayment for enrollees with incomes in the range of 2-5 mms is USD 195.20 annually. Finally, enrollees with incomes greater than 5 mms have a maximum copayment of USD390.30 annually. SR copayments are set according to SISBEN category. The poorest enrollees, who are classified in category 1, pay co copayments. On the opposite end of the scale, enrollees classified in category 3 pay 10% of the service value. General System of Social Security in HealthProvider payment mechanisms Provider Payment Mechanisms: Fee-for-service, Capitation EPSs and EPSSs are free to establish payment levels and payment mechanisms for services that they purchase from providers. Both entities have used the fee schedules, adjusted for inflation, developed by the pre-reform public health plans as ceilings for price negotiations. As of 2008, provider associations were forcefully seeking the establishment of price floors by the MPS. There are two payment mechanisms common to both EPSs and EPSSs. In general, preventive and primary care services are contracted on a capitation basis. Most specialist and hospital care, however, is paid for either on a fee-for-service basis or by a services package. The CR and SR enrollees must also pay copayments, which vary according to an individual’s income. CR copayments are charged according to salary income. Enrollees with salaries lower than 2 minimum monthly salaries (mms) have a maximum copayment of USD46.70 annually. The maximum copayment for enrollees with incomes in the range of 2-5 mms is USD 195.20 annually. Finally, enrollees with incomes greater than 5 mms have a maximum copayment of USD390.30 annually. SR copayments are set according to SISBEN category. The poorest enrollees, who are classified in category 1, pay co copayments. On the opposite end of the scale, enrollees classified in category 3 pay 10% of the service value. |
| Kyrgyz Republic: Mandatory Health Insurance Fund (MHIF) |
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Outpatient care is funded through capitation-based payments while hospital services are funded through case-based payments. The capitation formula for primary care is adjusted by coefficients for rural, small towns, and mountainous areas. This leads to cross-subsidization across geographical boundaries. Read full sectionOutpatient care is funded through capitation-based payments while hospital services are funded through case-based payments. The capitation formula for primary care is adjusted by coefficients for rural, small towns, and mountainous areas. This leads to cross-subsidization across geographical boundaries. The base primary care capitation rate (before adjustment coefficients) is based on two variables, the estimated number of enrollees that are expected to be enrolled in a family group practice over the coming year, and the size of the budget. The case-based payments for hospital services introduced the idea of output-based payments to the Kyrgyz health system. The system for grouping cases, generally called clinical statistical groups, was based on American diagnosis-related-groups, but was created with Kyrgyz utilization and cost data. This new system enabled an expansion of the budget management autonomy of hospital administrators, although hospital autonomy and management capacity is still an issue on the reform agenda. The republican MHIF and its territorial branches administer the national pool of funds for the SGBP and are responsible for making all case- and capitation-based payments. Per-case payment rates are defined prospectively but payments are made on a monthly basis. In order to avoid provider selection, providers receive higher payments for treating exempt patients and those with lower copayments. A key to the success of the MHIF as the single-payer for the SGBP has been the continuous development and refinement of financial and clinical information systems to operate the provider payment systems and ensure good financial reporting and fiduciary risk mitigation. Mandatory Health Insurance Fund (MHIF)Provider payment mechanisms Provider Payment Mechanisms: Capitation, Diagnosis-Related Groups Outpatient care is funded through capitation-based payments while hospital services are funded through case-based payments. The capitation formula for primary care is adjusted by coefficients for rural, small towns, and mountainous areas. This leads to cross-subsidization across geographical boundaries. The base primary care capitation rate (before adjustment coefficients) is based on two variables, the estimated number of enrollees that are expected to be enrolled in a family group practice over the coming year, and the size of the budget. The case-based payments for hospital services introduced the idea of output-based payments to the Kyrgyz health system. The system for grouping cases, generally called clinical statistical groups, was based on American diagnosis-related-groups, but was created with Kyrgyz utilization and cost data. This new system enabled an expansion of the budget management autonomy of hospital administrators, although hospital autonomy and management capacity is still an issue on the reform agenda. The republican MHIF and its territorial branches administer the national pool of funds for the SGBP and are responsible for making all case- and capitation-based payments. Per-case payment rates are defined prospectively but payments are made on a monthly basis. In order to avoid provider selection, providers receive higher payments for treating exempt patients and those with lower copayments. A key to the success of the MHIF as the single-payer for the SGBP has been the continuous development and refinement of financial and clinical information systems to operate the provider payment systems and ensure good financial reporting and fiduciary risk mitigation. |
| Mali: Mutuelles |
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In Mali, the provider payment system for all three systems is fee-for-service. The Mutuelles sign individual agreements with the care providers and reimburse them according to the payment rates under a fee-for-service system. Services are paid for directly by the CANAM and the ANAM to the providers by submitting invoices based on the national pricing system and health care services coverage rates (minus the copayment). A medical control is also included. Read full sectionIn Mali, the provider payment system for all three systems is fee-for-service. The Mutuelles sign individual agreements with the care providers and reimburse them according to the payment rates under a fee-for-service system. Services are paid for directly by the CANAM and the ANAM to the providers by submitting invoices based on the national pricing system and health care services coverage rates (minus the copayment). A medical control is also included. For the AMO and RAMED, the health institutions, dispensing pharmacies, drug warehouses, and the laboratories approved by the Ministry of Health may sign contracts with the Government Management Agency, the National Health Insurance Fund (CANAM) for the AMO, and the National Medical Assistance Agency (ANAM) for RAMED. Although an accreditation system is planned in Mali, at startup time for the AMO and RAMED, all public and community facilities were temporarily accredited until the system became operational. MutuellesProvider payment mechanisms Provider Payment Mechanisms: Fee-for-service In Mali, the provider payment system for all three systems is fee-for-service. The Mutuelles sign individual agreements with the care providers and reimburse them according to the payment rates under a fee-for-service system. Services are paid for directly by the CANAM and the ANAM to the providers by submitting invoices based on the national pricing system and health care services coverage rates (minus the copayment). A medical control is also included. For the AMO and RAMED, the health institutions, dispensing pharmacies, drug warehouses, and the laboratories approved by the Ministry of Health may sign contracts with the Government Management Agency, the National Health Insurance Fund (CANAM) for the AMO, and the National Medical Assistance Agency (ANAM) for RAMED. Although an accreditation system is planned in Mali, at startup time for the AMO and RAMED, all public and community facilities were temporarily accredited until the system became operational. |
| Chile: National Health Fund (FONASA) |
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FONASA transfers money to public health care providers through fee-for-service mechanisms for certain services and groups of services that are assigned a fixed value. The remainder of resources for health care services and facility maintenance in the public sector is transferred based on historical budgets, which tend to be antiquated and therefore undervalued. In terms of transfer mechanisms, FONASA funds are not transferred directly to the individual health care providers. Read full sectionFONASA transfers money to public health care providers through fee-for-service mechanisms for certain services and groups of services that are assigned a fixed value. The remainder of resources for health care services and facility maintenance in the public sector is transferred based on historical budgets, which tend to be antiquated and therefore undervalued. In terms of transfer mechanisms, FONASA funds are not transferred directly to the individual health care providers. Rather, funds are transferred to the regional health entity (under the purview of the MOH) for the geographical region where the provider is located. The regional health entity pools the funds for all public health care providers in the area and then is charged with determining the budget of each provider. FONASA also transfers funds prospectively to the regional health entities for primary care facilities through capitation mechanisms. These funds are based on a region’s health care needs and its disease burden. FONASA and the ISAPREs transfer funds to private providers on a retrospective fee-for-service basis. Private providers always receive funds through fee-for-service mechanisms, and they have no ceiling on income, regardless of whether the source of the funds is FONASA or an ISAPRE. National Health Fund (FONASA)Provider payment mechanisms Provider Payment Mechanisms: Fee-for-service, Capitation FONASA transfers money to public health care providers through fee-for-service mechanisms for certain services and groups of services that are assigned a fixed value. The remainder of resources for health care services and facility maintenance in the public sector is transferred based on historical budgets, which tend to be antiquated and therefore undervalued. In terms of transfer mechanisms, FONASA funds are not transferred directly to the individual health care providers. Rather, funds are transferred to the regional health entity (under the purview of the MOH) for the geographical region where the provider is located. The regional health entity pools the funds for all public health care providers in the area and then is charged with determining the budget of each provider. FONASA also transfers funds prospectively to the regional health entities for primary care facilities through capitation mechanisms. These funds are based on a region’s health care needs and its disease burden. FONASA and the ISAPREs transfer funds to private providers on a retrospective fee-for-service basis. Private providers always receive funds through fee-for-service mechanisms, and they have no ceiling on income, regardless of whether the source of the funds is FONASA or an ISAPRE. |
| : Taiwan: National Health Insurance |
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Providers obtain their revenues from 3 sources: 1) payments by the NHI; 2) patient user fees and co-payments; and 3) proceeds from the sale of products and services not covered by the NHI. The government acts as the single-payer system with a uniform payment schedule that has effectively controlled the cost shifting that occurred frequently before the implementation of NHI. Read full sectionProviders obtain their revenues from 3 sources: 1) payments by the NHI; 2) patient user fees and co-payments; and 3) proceeds from the sale of products and services not covered by the NHI. The government acts as the single-payer system with a uniform payment schedule that has effectively controlled the cost shifting that occurred frequently before the implementation of NHI. Initially, NHI providers were paid on a fee-for-service basis, however providers were able to make sizable profits by overprescribing medications and ordering unnecessary procedures, leading to quickly rising per person expenditures. Hospitals in Taiwan reward their staff physicians individually for bringing in revenue, known as a “professional fee,” further encouraging physician-induced over-prescription. The Bureau of National Health Insurance (BNHI) estimates that overuse and misuse of health care may constitute up to a third of BNHI’s expenditures. Facing the need for cost containment, BNHI introduced a reasonable volume standard for outpatient visits coupled with a sliding fee schedule for visits above the volume standard, which discouraged supply-induced demand and reduced the number of visits per person. BNHI also reduced the high profit margin that clinics and hospitals can obtain from dispensing drugs by reducing the reimbursement rates for drugs, using reference pricing, and encouraging the use of generic drugs. The NHI experimented with different payment systems, such as diagnosis-related groups (DRGs) for hospitals, primary care capitation for certain population groups, and even performance-based payments. DRGs were phased in for the 50 most common diseases and treatments, which effectively reduced the average length-of-stay in hospitals. The ultimate cost control measure, however, has been the imposition of global budgets for hospital outpatient and inpatient services in 2002. This remains highly controversial because global budgeting incorporates an aggregate fixed sum budget imposed on all hospitals in Taiwan collectively, creating a zero-sum game in which the players cannot effectively police one another. Reimbursement contracts are negotiated with health care providers on a fee-for-service basis with a uniform pay schedule. A deflation mechanism engages once a service quota is reached, resulting in declining reimbursement rates. Under the global budget payment system, the NHI Medical Expenditure Negotiation Committee convenes and negotiates overall caps on total medical payments based on a set of equations and indicators prior to the beginning of a fiscal year. Along with the implementation of global budgets, the NHI took several measures to control the demand for selected types of health care, such as increasing copayments for high users of drugs and outpatient services. The global budget payment system with these measures has been successful in containing the annual growth in the health insurance system's expenditures with spending growth leveling out at below 5% a year since it was fully implemented in July 2002. National Health InsuranceProvider payment mechanisms Provider Payment Mechanisms: Fee-for-service, Diagnosis-Related Groups, Global budgets Providers obtain their revenues from 3 sources: 1) payments by the NHI; 2) patient user fees and co-payments; and 3) proceeds from the sale of products and services not covered by the NHI. The government acts as the single-payer system with a uniform payment schedule that has effectively controlled the cost shifting that occurred frequently before the implementation of NHI. Initially, NHI providers were paid on a fee-for-service basis, however providers were able to make sizable profits by overprescribing medications and ordering unnecessary procedures, leading to quickly rising per person expenditures. Hospitals in Taiwan reward their staff physicians individually for bringing in revenue, known as a “professional fee,” further encouraging physician-induced over-prescription. The Bureau of National Health Insurance (BNHI) estimates that overuse and misuse of health care may constitute up to a third of BNHI’s expenditures. Facing the need for cost containment, BNHI introduced a reasonable volume standard for outpatient visits coupled with a sliding fee schedule for visits above the volume standard, which discouraged supply-induced demand and reduced the number of visits per person. BNHI also reduced the high profit margin that clinics and hospitals can obtain from dispensing drugs by reducing the reimbursement rates for drugs, using reference pricing, and encouraging the use of generic drugs. The NHI experimented with different payment systems, such as diagnosis-related groups (DRGs) for hospitals, primary care capitation for certain population groups, and even performance-based payments. DRGs were phased in for the 50 most common diseases and treatments, which effectively reduced the average length-of-stay in hospitals. The ultimate cost control measure, however, has been the imposition of global budgets for hospital outpatient and inpatient services in 2002. This remains highly controversial because global budgeting incorporates an aggregate fixed sum budget imposed on all hospitals in Taiwan collectively, creating a zero-sum game in which the players cannot effectively police one another. Reimbursement contracts are negotiated with health care providers on a fee-for-service basis with a uniform pay schedule. A deflation mechanism engages once a service quota is reached, resulting in declining reimbursement rates. Under the global budget payment system, the NHI Medical Expenditure Negotiation Committee convenes and negotiates overall caps on total medical payments based on a set of equations and indicators prior to the beginning of a fiscal year. Along with the implementation of global budgets, the NHI took several measures to control the demand for selected types of health care, such as increasing copayments for high users of drugs and outpatient services. The global budget payment system with these measures has been successful in containing the annual growth in the health insurance system's expenditures with spending growth leveling out at below 5% a year since it was fully implemented in July 2002. |
| Korea, Rep.: National Health Insurance Program |
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Providers have historically been reimbursed by the regulated fee-for-service system since the beginning of the national health insurance program (NHIP). There is no difference between public and private providers from the health insurer side regarding fee schedules or reimbursement rates. The fee-for-service system has led to an increase in volume and intensity of services in the long run. However, because fee regulation is applied to all providers, both public and private, it has contributed to overall cost containment and a rapid extension of population coverage. South Korea has single pooled purchasing, and claim reviews and payments are centralized and monitored by the Ministry of Health and Welfare (MoHW). Read full sectionProviders have historically been reimbursed by the regulated fee-for-service system since the beginning of the national health insurance program (NHIP). There is no difference between public and private providers from the health insurer side regarding fee schedules or reimbursement rates. The fee-for-service system has led to an increase in volume and intensity of services in the long run. However, because fee regulation is applied to all providers, both public and private, it has contributed to overall cost containment and a rapid extension of population coverage. South Korea has single pooled purchasing, and claim reviews and payments are centralized and monitored by the Ministry of Health and Welfare (MoHW). In 1997 the government launched a Diagnosis Related Group Pilot program for voluntary participating health facilities. The pilot program showed positive impacts on the behavior of health providers, such as the reduction in the length of stay, medical expenses, the average number of tests and a decreased use of antibiotics. However, there is strong opposition from providers, which has blocked the extension of DRG as a provider payment mechanism throughout the country. The pharmaceutical dispensing was separated from prescribing in 2000. This bars pharmacists from selling antibiotics to customers without a prescription. As such, physicians are not allowed to dispense medicines. National Health Insurance ProgramProvider payment mechanisms Provider Payment Mechanisms: Fee-for-service Providers have historically been reimbursed by the regulated fee-for-service system since the beginning of the national health insurance program (NHIP). There is no difference between public and private providers from the health insurer side regarding fee schedules or reimbursement rates. The fee-for-service system has led to an increase in volume and intensity of services in the long run. However, because fee regulation is applied to all providers, both public and private, it has contributed to overall cost containment and a rapid extension of population coverage. South Korea has single pooled purchasing, and claim reviews and payments are centralized and monitored by the Ministry of Health and Welfare (MoHW). In 1997 the government launched a Diagnosis Related Group Pilot program for voluntary participating health facilities. The pilot program showed positive impacts on the behavior of health providers, such as the reduction in the length of stay, medical expenses, the average number of tests and a decreased use of antibiotics. However, there is strong opposition from providers, which has blocked the extension of DRG as a provider payment mechanism throughout the country. The pharmaceutical dispensing was separated from prescribing in 2000. This bars pharmacists from selling antibiotics to customers without a prescription. As such, physicians are not allowed to dispense medicines. |
| Ghana: National Health Insurance Scheme (NHIS) |
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In 2004, a memorandum of understanding regarding the services covered and prices charged was signed by the NHIC and service provider representatives. Claims are filed by the health facilities and the district schemes pay providers on a DRG basis. Typically, a reimbursement check comes 6 months after a claim is submitted. Read full sectionIn 2004, a memorandum of understanding regarding the services covered and prices charged was signed by the NHIC and service provider representatives. Claims are filed by the health facilities and the district schemes pay providers on a DRG basis. Typically, a reimbursement check comes 6 months after a claim is submitted. This memorandum now forms the basis of all contracts between the health schemes and providers. Claims processing is a manual process, with some automation in enrollment verifications and claims documentation. The amount of the reimbursement is often less than 100%, with some schemes, for example, paying 70% (e.g., Ossu Kottery – urban scheme in higher income area of Accra), others paying as low as 40% (e.g., Dodowah, rural area outside Accra). The balance is supposed to be paid at later date. National Health Insurance Scheme (NHIS)Provider payment mechanisms Provider Payment Mechanisms: Diagnosis-Related Groups In 2004, a memorandum of understanding regarding the services covered and prices charged was signed by the NHIC and service provider representatives. Claims are filed by the health facilities and the district schemes pay providers on a DRG basis. Typically, a reimbursement check comes 6 months after a claim is submitted. This memorandum now forms the basis of all contracts between the health schemes and providers. Claims processing is a manual process, with some automation in enrollment verifications and claims documentation. The amount of the reimbursement is often less than 100%, with some schemes, for example, paying 70% (e.g., Ossu Kottery – urban scheme in higher income area of Accra), others paying as low as 40% (e.g., Dodowah, rural area outside Accra). The balance is supposed to be paid at later date. |
| Philippines: PhilHealth |
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Provider payment methods differ based on the type of care delivered. Fee-for-service reimbursements are used for inpatient care, most day surgeries, and ambulatory procedures, while primary care providers are reimbursed based on a capitation system. Read full sectionProvider payment methods differ based on the type of care delivered. Fee-for-service reimbursements are used for inpatient care, most day surgeries, and ambulatory procedures, while primary care providers are reimbursed based on a capitation system. For TB-DOTS treatment, malaria care, deliveries, surgical contraception, and cataract surgeries, a case-based payment methodology is utilized. There is no formal system that sets fixed deductibles or co-payments for beneficiaries, but health care providers are allowed to “balance bill”, charging patients the balance between what PhilHealth pays and the total cost of care. This is atypical of most government health programs around the world and can lead to abuse by providers (e.g., overcharging) and thus limited access for the poorest. At the same time, balance billing allows providers additional cost recovery in the case that the reimbursement for services does not cover their cost. Quality: PhilHealth currently leverages internally developed quality standards. A new set of standards called the “PhilHealth Benchbook” was implemented starting January 1, 2010. The Benchbook was developed by PhilHealth with the assistance of various international health partners and several rounds of consultations with health providers. The previous and new quality standards are overseen by PhilHealth. The new quality standards focus on the following domains of quality of care: patient rights and organizational ethic, patient care, leadership and management, human resource management, information management, safe practice and environment, and mechanisms of improving performance. With the implementation of the new standards this year, hospitals can now be accredited for up to 3 years compared with the previous practice of annual accreditation. PhilHealth has accreditation staff who physically check and verify compliance. PhilHealth has also set peer review committees essentially composed of health care providers who review specific cases. PhilHealth has been planning to implement quality-based purchasing but has not executed on this plan as of December 2009. Performance-based Payment: PhilHealth has been developing incentive payments but this work has been focused on payment to health care professionals and not for health facilities. Doctors are usually independent free agents who ‘practice’ in hospitals. Even government physicians who are salaried are allowed to engage in private practice. Thus, PhilHealth payments are split for health professionals and health facilities and efforts to implement case payments essentially focus on bundling the payment for the health facilities. Among PhilHealth’s work in incentive-based payments is a scheme that has been piloted in 30 local government hospitals since 2002 but has not been scaled up. The scheme is called the Quality Improvement Demonstration Study (QIDS). It utilizes clinical vignettes to measure quality of care. If a hospital passes a set quality of care index score, the payment for physicians is increased. Clinical vignettes focus on the management of illnesses of children less than six years of age. Another incentive scheme is increased payment for health professionals practicing in areas where there is a lack of doctors. Claims Processing: The claims processing procedure is still a manual operation. Electronic claims submissions have long been planned but have not been implemented. Hospitals or members fill out claims forms that are then submitted to PhilHealth within 90 days from hospital or health facility discharge. Two forms are usually submitted: First, a form that documents who the member is and premiums paid; and second, a form that details the service provided. Claims are submitted to 17 regional claims processing centers. These centers initially review if the claims are eligible. Review is inputted manually with a number of data encoded into the claims processing information system. Once the claim is approved for payment, checks are prepared for the signature of regional heads. Electronic reimbursements have been planned but have not yet been implemented. PhilHealthProvider payment mechanisms Provider Payment Mechanisms: Fee-for-service, Capitation Provider payment methods differ based on the type of care delivered. Fee-for-service reimbursements are used for inpatient care, most day surgeries, and ambulatory procedures, while primary care providers are reimbursed based on a capitation system. For TB-DOTS treatment, malaria care, deliveries, surgical contraception, and cataract surgeries, a case-based payment methodology is utilized. There is no formal system that sets fixed deductibles or co-payments for beneficiaries, but health care providers are allowed to “balance bill”, charging patients the balance between what PhilHealth pays and the total cost of care. This is atypical of most government health programs around the world and can lead to abuse by providers (e.g., overcharging) and thus limited access for the poorest. At the same time, balance billing allows providers additional cost recovery in the case that the reimbursement for services does not cover their cost. Quality: PhilHealth currently leverages internally developed quality standards. A new set of standards called the “PhilHealth Benchbook” was implemented starting January 1, 2010. The Benchbook was developed by PhilHealth with the assistance of various international health partners and several rounds of consultations with health providers. The previous and new quality standards are overseen by PhilHealth. The new quality standards focus on the following domains of quality of care: patient rights and organizational ethic, patient care, leadership and management, human resource management, information management, safe practice and environment, and mechanisms of improving performance. With the implementation of the new standards this year, hospitals can now be accredited for up to 3 years compared with the previous practice of annual accreditation. PhilHealth has accreditation staff who physically check and verify compliance. PhilHealth has also set peer review committees essentially composed of health care providers who review specific cases. PhilHealth has been planning to implement quality-based purchasing but has not executed on this plan as of December 2009. Performance-based Payment: PhilHealth has been developing incentive payments but this work has been focused on payment to health care professionals and not for health facilities. Doctors are usually independent free agents who ‘practice’ in hospitals. Even government physicians who are salaried are allowed to engage in private practice. Thus, PhilHealth payments are split for health professionals and health facilities and efforts to implement case payments essentially focus on bundling the payment for the health facilities. Among PhilHealth’s work in incentive-based payments is a scheme that has been piloted in 30 local government hospitals since 2002 but has not been scaled up. The scheme is called the Quality Improvement Demonstration Study (QIDS). It utilizes clinical vignettes to measure quality of care. If a hospital passes a set quality of care index score, the payment for physicians is increased. Clinical vignettes focus on the management of illnesses of children less than six years of age. Another incentive scheme is increased payment for health professionals practicing in areas where there is a lack of doctors. Claims Processing: The claims processing procedure is still a manual operation. Electronic claims submissions have long been planned but have not been implemented. Hospitals or members fill out claims forms that are then submitted to PhilHealth within 90 days from hospital or health facility discharge. Two forms are usually submitted: First, a form that documents who the member is and premiums paid; and second, a form that details the service provided. Claims are submitted to 17 regional claims processing centers. These centers initially review if the claims are eligible. Review is inputted manually with a number of data encoded into the claims processing information system. Once the claim is approved for payment, checks are prepared for the signature of regional heads. Electronic reimbursements have been planned but have not yet been implemented. |
| Mexico: Seguro Popular |
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The interventions included in the CAUSES are paid for by capitation. Meanwhile, the interventions carried out under the FPGC are paid for on a per-case basis. The payment mechanism for contracts with private providers is vague. The reform stated that health services should be provided by state health secretariats in accordance with the state of residence of the insured family or by other public health institutions that have contracted with the state health secretariats. After the passage of the law, however, the executive branch issued a by-law that introduced the option of contracting with the private sector. The problem with this by-law is that it does not specify the form that payments to private sector will take. Thus, such payments take place on an ad-hoc, non-systematic basis. Read full sectionThe interventions included in the CAUSES are paid for by capitation. Meanwhile, the interventions carried out under the FPGC are paid for on a per-case basis. The payment mechanism for contracts with private providers is vague. The reform stated that health services should be provided by state health secretariats in accordance with the state of residence of the insured family or by other public health institutions that have contracted with the state health secretariats. After the passage of the law, however, the executive branch issued a by-law that introduced the option of contracting with the private sector. The problem with this by-law is that it does not specify the form that payments to private sector will take. Thus, such payments take place on an ad-hoc, non-systematic basis. Seguro PopularProvider payment mechanisms Provider Payment Mechanisms: Fee-for-service, Capitation, Diagnosis-Related Groups The interventions included in the CAUSES are paid for by capitation. Meanwhile, the interventions carried out under the FPGC are paid for on a per-case basis. The payment mechanism for contracts with private providers is vague. The reform stated that health services should be provided by state health secretariats in accordance with the state of residence of the insured family or by other public health institutions that have contracted with the state health secretariats. After the passage of the law, however, the executive branch issued a by-law that introduced the option of contracting with the private sector. The problem with this by-law is that it does not specify the form that payments to private sector will take. Thus, such payments take place on an ad-hoc, non-systematic basis. |
| Brazil: Unified Health System (SUS) |
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Primary care providers at the municipal level are paid on a per capita basis. Transfers from state and federal resources trickle down to the municipal level through streams such as the basic health program (PAB), the PSF, and the PACS. Read full sectionPrimary care providers at the municipal level are paid on a per capita basis. Transfers from state and federal resources trickle down to the municipal level through streams such as the basic health program (PAB), the PSF, and the PACS. The same method of provider payments is used for both private and public providers under the SUS. Payments for hospital stays and complex procedures are based on Hospital Stay Authorization (AIH) codes. The AIH payment system is a procedure- or service-based rate system that is not linked to resource usage or costs. Fixed values are established per disease and necessary procedures. Hospitals that undertake complex procedures receive additional resources to maintain their facilities. Ambulatory services are paid by the health funds based on Ambulatory Care Units (UCA) plus an additional fixed amount for each service rendered.
Unified Health System (SUS)Provider payment mechanisms Provider Payment Mechanisms: Capitation, Diagnosis-Related Groups Primary care providers at the municipal level are paid on a per capita basis. Transfers from state and federal resources trickle down to the municipal level through streams such as the basic health program (PAB), the PSF, and the PACS. The same method of provider payments is used for both private and public providers under the SUS. Payments for hospital stays and complex procedures are based on Hospital Stay Authorization (AIH) codes. The AIH payment system is a procedure- or service-based rate system that is not linked to resource usage or costs. Fixed values are established per disease and necessary procedures. Hospitals that undertake complex procedures receive additional resources to maintain their facilities. Ambulatory services are paid by the health funds based on Ambulatory Care Units (UCA) plus an additional fixed amount for each service rendered.
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| Thailand: Universal Coverage Scheme |
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UCS uses capitation as the main provider payment mechanism. Initially, providers were given the option of receiving reimbursements based on either total capitation or capitation for outpatient services and DRG for inpatient services at the provincial level. However, due to the disincentive of paying providers for high-cost care and delays in case referrals, UCS began using a single payment system in 2003. Read full sectionUCS uses capitation as the main provider payment mechanism. Initially, providers were given the option of receiving reimbursements based on either total capitation or capitation for outpatient services and DRG for inpatient services at the provincial level. However, due to the disincentive of paying providers for high-cost care and delays in case referrals, UCS began using a single payment system in 2003. The current payment mechanism for UCS is a mixed system of risk-adjusted capitation for primary care, a DRG-based capped global budget, and fixed rate fees for some services. It should be noted that health promotion and prevention services for all Thai citizens are paid by the UCS. Universal Coverage SchemeProvider payment mechanisms Provider Payment Mechanisms: Capitation UCS uses capitation as the main provider payment mechanism. Initially, providers were given the option of receiving reimbursements based on either total capitation or capitation for outpatient services and DRG for inpatient services at the provincial level. However, due to the disincentive of paying providers for high-cost care and delays in case referrals, UCS began using a single payment system in 2003. The current payment mechanism for UCS is a mixed system of risk-adjusted capitation for primary care, a DRG-based capped global budget, and fixed rate fees for some services. It should be noted that health promotion and prevention services for all Thai citizens are paid by the UCS. |
