UHC Forward: Towards Universal Health Coverage

In both the CR and the SR individuals choose their insurer as well as the provider within the insurer’s network. Enrollment mechanisms between the two systems, however, are quite distinct. While anyone is free to enroll in the CR, it is mandatory for formal sector workers and self-employed workers who earn one minimum salary per month. The CR enrolled 13,335,932 persons in 2001 and 17,234,265 persons in 2008.

Between 1993, when the reform was passed, and 2002, there arose the need to implement monitoring and supervision mechanisms to enforce the enrollment of self-employed workers in the CR. This has largely been achieved through two distinct methods. First, law 797 of 2003 linked pension and health insurance contributions. This affected enrollee evasion, as individuals wishing to have a pension must also have health insurance. It also affected contribution evasion, since the income level used to calculate pension contributions is also used to calculate CR contributions. Second, decree 1703 of 2002 instituted sanctions on employers if they did not ensure that self-employed workers (e.g. consultants) participated in the CR. Finally, between 2006and 2007 the Integrated Payroll Contributions Settlement system was instituted, obliging all companies and the self-employed to settle their social security payments through electronic fund transfers.

While the expansion of the SR was taking place, a unique and innovative enrollment qualification criteria was used designed to give priority to targeted groups based on income level and degree of vulnerability/likely need for care, while taking into consideration the available funds. Priority was given to special populations such as orphans and the elderly, regardless of SISBEN score, which is the proxy-means test used to identify the most vulnerable members of a community. Preference was then assigned to the poor who were either pregnant, under the age of 5, displaced by violence, or disabled. The rest of the population was ordered by SISBEN score, with a score of 1 representing the most destitute and a score of 5 representing the least destitute. Once the ranked list was published, individuals signed up with an EPSS of their choice. If an individual did not sign up, he or she had to wait until the next round of affiliations to do so. Enrollment of those who were eligible was ongoing as additional funds become available. Also, after all level 1 and 2 individuals were covered, municipalities that had resources left over could begin to cover level 3 individuals. This process was slightly altered by Accord number 415 of 2009, which states that the non-affiliated, eligible population can sign up with the SR at any point during the year. In 2002 the SR enrolled 11,444,003 persons. By 2009, this number had risen to 23,804,788.

An important issue is the monitoring of fraud within the SR. Starting in 2000, the government began monitoring and updating the subsidized scheme databases. This led to the expulsion of many fraudulent enrollees. By 2005, a complete database of SR enrollees had been set up and included their names, identification numbers, and the name of their EPSS. This database was completed in 2009.

Beginning in 2004, there was an expansion of partial subsidies to SISBEN level 3 individuals. The UPC for this plan equals approximately 42% of the CR UPC. While this plan expands coverage to those who remain uninsured, it offers a smaller benefits package. As of March 2009 there are 1,115,789 individuals covered by partial subsidies.

Lack of automatic mobility between the SR and CR upon a change in labor standing among the poor is thought to be a disincentive for Colombians to move into formal employment. The fear existed primarily among subsidized regime enrollees who would not be able to easily rejoin the SR if they lost their formal sector employment. To deal with this concern, in 2005 the government stated that a person can be reinstated into the SR within the year in case of subsequent eligibility changes. Furthermore, at the end of the year the process of re-enrolling in the SR will be quicker and easier. This change should lead to expansions in the formal workforce and higher levels of CR enrollment as more people are willing to leave the SR.

Population coverage has increased significantly since the 1993 reform, with a substantial part of the growth taking place after 2002. In 1990, 15.7% of the population had health insurance coverage. By 2008 the percentage of those covered had risen to 89.36%. This is a 570% increase in coverage over an 18 year span. The populations that were most affected by the reform were the bottom 2 income quintiles. Figure II shows that coverage for quintile 1 increased by 540% while quintile 2 increased by 250% between 1992 and 2003. Figure 2 also shows that there was a drop in coverage between 1997 and 2000, with an eventual recovery in 2003. This effect was primarily caused by a severe macroeconomic recession between 1998 and 2000. The recession not only reduced formal employment, affecting enrollment in the CR as well as the solidarity contribution to the SR, but it also reduced general tax transfers to the SR. With the recession ended and renewed political support for health coverage, the growth trend continued its upward movement.

Enrollment in the Mutuelle system is voluntary and is primarily coordinated at the district and sector level. Each community-based Mutuelle is responsible for increasing enrollment, maintaining re-enrollment, educating the population about the program, verifying the number of participants in each household, and collecting membership contributions. Outreach is done most frequently at the community level via church services, radio broadcasts, etc, and tends to focus largely on the rural and informal sector in order to most effectively target those individuals unable to access formal health insurance through other means.

Enrollment for Rwanda Health Insurance Scheme (La Rwandaise d’Assurance Maladie or RAMA) and Military Medical Insurance (MMI) are coordinated through the government and employers. Initially only civil servants and their families were covered with RAMA, however, in 2003 coverage expanded to all those employed in both the public and the private sector. In 2006 RAMA only covered approximately 2.2% of the population. Coverage through MMI is provided for all members of the Rwandan Defense Force. Family members of MMI affiliates are covered under the same conditions as in RAMA. The exact number of beneficiaries is difficult to calculate due to national security issues but an estimated figure of 100,000 individuals or approximately 1.1% of the total Rwandan population is estimated to be covered. Combined, these programs insure less than 5% of the population.

The result of these health insurance programs has been an incredible upsurge in health insurance enrollment. USAID estimates that in 2010 approximately 92% of the population had health coverage, up from about 10% in 1999 since the implementation of the Community-Based Health Initiatives (CBHI). Geographically, enrollment has expanded from about 4 provinces to all 11 provinces. After national expansion of CBHI, participation increased coverage to 5.8 million persons, about 70% of the population. The Ministry of Health has stated that the rapid uptake seen in the early years of the program undoubtedly speaks to the communal and grassroots dynamics of the country.

Health insurance is obtained either through private insurers or the National Health Insurance Scheme (NHIS). About 5 million people are enrolled in the 3 NHIS Programs, which represents just about 3% of the population. In the Formal Sector Program, employees in the formal sector who pay premiums are covered, in addition to their spouse and up to 4 dependants. Companies that employ more than 10 workers are responsible for enrollment of their employees.

In the Informal Sector Program, the self-employed and individuals living in rural communities enroll themselves. The self-employed must join with at least 500 other members who are occupation based (ie: taxi drivers) to qualify. Rural dwellers have a similar modus operandi, but participants need to belong to the same community rather than the same occupational group. These Social Health Insurance Schemes are self-governed, with elections held to determine who will represent the community. In order to stay enrolled, members are expected to make a monthly contribution actuarially determined based on the benefits package of their choice. Participants requiring specialist or longer treatment would need to pay for the balance from what they are entitled from the common pool. These schemes are expected to cover more than 60% of the rural and self-employed population, though due to poor data collection, the exact population enrolled is difficult to determine.

The enrollment levels in private insurance is uncertain, but based on submissions from private insurers to NHIS, less than 1 million people are privately insured.

The NHIS utilizes 61 Health Maintenance Organizations (HMOs) as health managers for paying healthcare providers, quality assurance, and registration of enrollees and sensitization of participants as part of improving transparency of the system. HMOs contract with the NHIS to manage the enrollment of individuals in health insurance schemes; to collect their payments; pay the healthcare providers; and to provide basic quality management of the health insurance scheme that covers formal employees.

PhilHealth coverage is theoretically available to the entire population. The enrollment process differs based on the population group. For example, all formal sector workers must enroll at the start of employment. The poor are identified and enrolled by the local government.

The population is tagged to one of the four major population categorizations:

• Formal sector
• Indigents that are financed by central and local governments
• Retirees (non-paying members) who have already paid 120 months of membership
• The individual paying program (IPP) for those not eligible for the other three categories

The benefits package is essentially the same for each population group. The exception is for indigents and the Overseas Filipino Workers (OFW) who have additional outpatient primary care benefits (with the providers paid by capitation) however these benefits are available only through public providers.

However, the enrollment process for each population category differs. For the formal sector, employees are enrolled upon the start of employment. It is mandatory that all employees enroll in health insurance. No exceptions are allowed for the size of the company. For the poor, the local government determines “poorness” and enrolls those who are determined poor. For the rest of the population there is open enrollment—one can walk into a local enrollment office anytime to enroll.

While enrollment is mandatory only for the formal sector, for the remainder of the population, it is “construed” as voluntary although the law can be interpreted as being mandatory. There is an ongoing debate on the issue of mandated versus voluntary enrollment.

Enrollment in PhilHealth is by family so the premium paid covers the member, the spouse, eligible children (those less than 21 years of age), and eligible parents (those 60 years and above and who depend financially on the member). Given that enrollment is by family, documentation of proof of marriage and birth(s) are required before spouses and children are enrolled. This is a problem for indigenous population as they usually do not have marriage and birth certificates.

While the country has achieved significant strides in moving towards universal enrollment, covering the poor and informal sectors remains a challenge, with methods to enroll these populations through organized groups gaining very little traction. There is much ongoing discussion regarding the need for the central government to finance and/or subsidize the enrollment of the nation’s entire poor population. Leaving financial responsibility for insuring the poorest to local governments, coupled with a refusal to outright declare insurance as mandatory for all populations, makes it nearly impossible for the government to reach universal health coverage. It also forces PhilHealth to invest heavily in marketing campaigns for the program to local governments.